





RUSSIAN ELECTION INTERFERENCE  
AND RACE-BAITING 
Darin E.W. Johnson0F* 
Russian interference in the 2016 United States presi-
dential election exposed the nation’s vulnerability to targeted 
campaign disruption by foreign intelligence actors through 
social media.  The Russian cyber disinformation campaign 
exploited racial divisions in the United States to undermine 
public confidence in American electoral processes and institu-
tions, revealing how those divisions can be weaponized.  The 
campaign fed on racial divisions arising from institutionalized 
state practices that have a disparate discriminatory effect on 
racial minorities.  Successful in their online interference in 2016, 
Russian operatives continued to stoke these divisions in the 
2018 midterm election and have begun to do so in the 2020 
presidential election campaign.  Russia will continue to stir racial 
division in future elections, and other states may follow suit.  
To combat this threat, reframing the manner in which national 
security institutions address matters of race is necessary. 
This Article advocates that national security institutions 
adopt an explicit “racism as national security threat” framework 
in place of the implicit “minority race as threat” framework that 
has previously shaped national security institutions’ behavior.  
It traces how a minority race as threat framework has histori-
cally guided national security institutional action in significant 
ways.  Further, it elucidates how a racism as national security 
threat framework promotes American antidiscrimination law 
and international human rights law, and how the strategic 
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retrenchment of policies, programs, and practices that engender 
racial discrimination will reduce American vulnerability to 
foreign exploitation.  Ultimately, this Article seeks to popularize 
the understanding that racism subverts American national 
security, and frame the curtailment of institutionalized racism 
as a national security priority of the United States. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Widespread Russian interference in the 2016 United 
States presidential election through social media exposed the 
extent to which the United States is vulnerable, technologically 
and socially, to targeted foreign election disruption.  The Russian 
security state studied and exploited pandemic racial divisions to 
depress American voters’ confidence in electoral processes and 
faith in their democratic institutions.1  This exploitation was 
possible chiefly because institutionalized racism—perpetuated 
in the form of police shootings of unarmed African Americans,2 
racial profiling, and mass incarceration—had already contrib-
uted to racial polarization in the United States.3 
                                               
1 Ken Dilanian & Ben Popken, Russia Favored Trump, Targeted 




2 This Article uses the terms “Black” and “African American,” at 
times interchangeably, to refer to the community of people of African descent 
present in the United States.  Neither term is intended to exclude anyone 
not born in the United States nor possessing citizenship or residency status 
in the United States.  The terms are intended to be inclusive of anyone of 
the African diaspora, present in the United States, who has been or could 
be impacted by policies and practices targeted at people based upon their 
African descent.  The author acknowledges that race is a social construct. 
3 See, e.g., On Views of Race and Inequality, Blacks and Whites Are 
Worlds Apart, PEW RES. CTR. (June 27, 2016), http://www.pewsocialtrends 
.org/2016/06/27/on-views-of-race-and-inequality-blacks-and-whites-are-
worlds-apart/ [https://perma.cc/HBV5-KLAV] (finding “profound differences 
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Russia’s actions in 2016 were not unprecedented.  
During the Cold War, Russia exploited the United States’ mis-
treatment of minority populations to further its geopolitical 
agenda; the United States was susceptible to such exploitation 
due to ongoing institutionalized racism.4  As this Article will 
establish, the policies of American security institutions have 
reflected the racial biases present in the United States, often 
resulting in the treatment of minority communities as a security 
problem that must be contained through over-policing, racial 
profiling, mass incarceration, race-based internment, and 
suppressive investigation.  Consequently, minority racial identity 
itself has historically been seen as a security threat, as 
illustrated by examples such as the internment of Japanese 
Americans during World War II5 and the infiltration and 
disruption of civil rights organizations in the 1960’s and 1970’s.6  
Racialized state security practices continue to exist 
today—“broken windows” policing, stop-and-frisk policies, and 
racial profiling practices have effectively branded African 
American communities as criminal.7  Similarly, post-9/11 
domestic surveillance programs, targeted religion-based in-
vestigations, and racial profiling have categorized Muslim 
community members as terrorists,8 just as aggressive immi-
gration enforcement actions have deemed Latinx community 
                                               
between [B]lack and [W]hite adults in their views on racial discrimination, 
barriers to [B]lack progress and the prospects for change”). 
4 See generally MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND 
THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (William Chafe et al. eds., 2d prtg. 
2002). 
5 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 214–15 (1944). 
6 S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 6–7 (1976); see also United States v. U.S. 
Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (concerning government electronic 
surveillance of a civil rights activist’s communications). 
7 See Justin Peters, Loose Cigarettes Today, Civil Unrest Tomorrow: 
The Racist, Classist Origins of Broken Windows Policing, SLATE (Dec. 5, 
2014), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2014/12/edward-banfield-the-
racist-classist-origins-of-broken-windows-policing.html [https://perma.cc/ 
L6NY-EARJ]; see also N.Y. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL 
RIGHTS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF “BROKEN WINDOWS” POLICING IN 
NYC AND GENERAL NYPD ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE PUBLIC (2018), https://www 
.usccr.gov/pubs/2018/03-22-NYSAC.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RHL-5PTF]. 
8 Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 
1577–82 (2002); see also Khaled A. Beydoun, Islamophobia: Toward a Legal 
Definition and Framework, 116 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 108, 108–11 (2016). 
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members suspicious “illegals” who are dehumanized in political 
rhetoric.9 
This racial legacy is unsurprising because the nation 
itself was founded through processes rooted in racial oppression: 
the enslavement of Africans and the decimation of indigenous 
Americans.  These original sins created racial conflict that has 
continuously threatened the broader security of the United 
States.  Internal violence in the form of slave revolts, the Civil 
War, and the Indian Wars were inevitable given the state’s 
oppression and subjugation of Africans and indigenous people.10  
Over time, racial oppression in the United States benefitted 
foreign state enemies because it delegitimized the American 
democratic project on the world stage, thereby undermining 
the United States’ ability to achieve its geopolitical objectives.11 
Today, a new external threat, in the shape of weaponized 
racial division on social media, has arisen.  Social media provided 
the perfect platform for the Russian interference operation—it 
enabled Russian agents to construct false identities, target 
online communities with “fake news” and advertisements, and 
organize rallies and other activities furthering racial division.12  
The Russians ran a focused and specific campaign intended to 
divide and disrupt American communities.13  This campaign 
mirrored historical Russian election interference efforts 
throughout Europe that likewise sought to sway electoral out-
comes by inflaming racial, ethnic, and other societal divisions.14 
                                               
9 Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Calls Some Unauthorized 
Immigrants “Animals” in Rant, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2018), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2018/05/16/us/politics/trump-undocumented-immigrants-
animals.html [https://perma.cc/EZS6-UNXM]. 
10 The violent, internal racial conflict that the United States has 
experienced over the centuries—slave revolts, the so-called “Indian Wars,” 
the Civil War, race riots—is a result of state policies that enslaved and 
oppressed people of African descent and seized land from Native populations.  
Since before the nation’s founding, national security and domestic stability 
have been undermined by policies of racial oppression. 
11 See generally Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363 
(1992); Mary Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. 
REV. 61 (1988). 
12 Indictment, United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, No. 
1:18-cr-00032-DFL, 2018 WL 914777 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018) [hereinafter 
Indictment]. 
13 Id. 
14 See discussion infra Section II.C. 
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This Article’s goal is to widen the public conception 
that racism is an exploitable phenomenon that undermines 
American national security, and to frame the retrenchment of 
institutionalized racism as a national security priority of the 
United States.15  Part II of the Article provides background on 
Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election campaign, 
the 2018 midterm election, and ongoing interference leading up 
to the 2020 election.  It outlines how Russia’s security services 
capitalized on racism in a widespread and systematic manner 
that affected the majority of Americans.  It also discusses how 
Russia’s efforts were a continuation of its use of propaganda 
regarding American race relations during the Cold War and 
how Russia has similarly engaged in ethnic division campaigns 
in other countries. 
Part III introduces the idea of national security interest 
convergence, which posits that anti-discriminatory goals are 
best achieved when they align with the priority interests of 
the majority community and elite policymakers.  It argues that 
the current Russian interference campaign demonstrates the 
danger that inflamed racial division poses to national security.  
Specifically, it calls for an understanding of national security 
as encompassing the protection of a full, rich, and inclusive 
democratic project in which Americans and foreign nations 
maintain faith.  It advocates for the promotion of antidiscrim-
ination measures as a national security priority that protects 
our democratic institutions from foreign intervention. 
Part IV elaborates on the theory that national security 
institutions have historically approached issues of race through 
the use of a minority race as threat framework.  This framework 
reflects how American policymakers and institutions, including 
those in the national security community, have regarded mi-
nority communities as threats to a racialized hierarchy and 
status quo.  Through time, this minority race as threat frame-
work obscured the harm to national security caused by insti-
tutionalized racism that impacts minority communities.  These 
practices forged fertile ground for Russia’s racial exploitation 
                                               
15 This Article focuses on the retrenchment of institutionalized 
racism.  The retrenchment of personal racial biases and general societal 
discrimination are beyond the scope of this piece.  The national security 
justification for the retrenchment of institutionalized racial discrimination 
that this Article offers could also serve as justification for programs and 
initiatives that seek to alleviate personal racial bias and societal 
discrimination. 
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campaign.  Part V then discusses the domestic and international 
legal schemes that apply to foreign election interference.  It 
concludes that these legal structures were not designed to 
address the novel issue of Russia’s online weaponization of 
race and suggests that new approaches are necessary to respond 
to such interference.  
Part VI presents the solution to the minority race as 
threat approach to national security and to Russian exploitation 
of racial division, which is the adoption of a racism as threat 
framework that explicitly identifies institutionalized racism 
and discrimination as national security threats.  Part VII of this 
Article operationalizes the racism as threat approach and calls 
for the ratification of antidiscrimination measures that prioritize 
the retrenchment of institutionalized discrimination.  These 
measures include, among others, the express recognition of 
racism as a national security threat in executive orders, national 
security planning documents, and federal, state, and local 
legislation and policy planning.    
Part VIII concludes with an analysis of how a racism 
as national security threat framework furthers the equal pro-
tection and anti-subordination objectives of American and 
international antidiscrimination law.  The framework accom-
plishes this by creating a powerful policy rationale for state 
actors to proactively eliminate practices at the federal and local 
level that have discriminatory effects on racial minorities, 
further internal racial division, and foster opportunities for for-
eign manipulation.  The new framework converges an anti-
discrimination agenda with a national security agenda, 
promising greater protection for the civil rights of minority 
communities and for American democratic processes. 
 
II. RUSSIAN EXPLOITATION OF RACIAL DIVISION 
Beginning with the 2016 presidential campaign, Russia 
used social media to strategically exploit internal racial divisions 
in the United States in order to affect electoral outcomes.16  
                                               
16 Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s report on his investigation into 
Russian interference during the 2016 presidential election reveals that 
Russian operatives first began creating social media accounts in the United 
States in mid-2014, sending operatives to the United States to gather 
photographs and other information to create fictitious American personas 
for social media accounts and group pages.  These false accounts and group 
pages addressed divisive political issues and were designed to attract large 
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Russia’s racially divisive social media campaign parallels recent 
Russian campaigns to agitate ethnic division in European 
countries with the purpose of impacting political elections.  
Russia’s disinformation campaign in the United States is part 
of a modern-day global strategy of racial division that has a 
historical antecedent in the United States—Russia’s utilization 
of American racial division for geopolitical ends during the 
Cold War. 
 
A. Russian Cyber Interference in the 2016 Election 
and Beyond 
On January 17, 2017, two months after the 2016 United 
States presidential election, the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and National 
Security Agency (NSA) released a report stating that the 
Russian government had conducted an extensive social media 
campaign to influence the election.17  The intelligence agencies 
concluded that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the 
campaign and that “Russia’s goals were to undermine public 
faith in the US democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, 
and harm her electability and potential presidency.”18  They 
further deduced that the Russian disinformation campaign 
was widespread and multifaceted, encompassing both covert 
cyber activity and overt activity by Russian agencies, state-
owned media, third party intermediaries, and paid social media 
users.19  The agencies assessed that the operation was a 
continuation of long-established Russian efforts to influence 
American elections but marked a significant escalation in the 
level of directness, activity, and scope of effort.20  Moreover, they 
                                               
audiences—eventually, they became the foundation for Russia’s “active 
measures” campaign in the 2016 presidential election.  “Active measures” is 
a term Russian intelligence operatives use to refer to campaigns intended 
to influence international affairs.  1 ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, U.S. DEP'T OF 
JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 
2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 14–15 (2019) [hereinafter MUELLER REPORT 
VOL. 1], https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4TF-
HAMF]. 
17 OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, ICA 2017-01D, 
ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT U.S. ELECTIONS 
(2017) [hereinafter ODNI]. 
18 Id. at ii. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
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characterized the campaign as an extension of Russia’s enduring 
objective to undermine the United States-led liberal democratic 
order, which Russia perceives as a direct threat to Putin’s 
regime.21  An analyst with the Alliance for Securing Democracy22 
determined that the Russian effort to foment racial division 
intended to weaken the United States’ democratic institutions, 
thereby elevating Russia’s standing in the world.23 
In addition to covertly acquiring and leaking e-mails 
from the Democratic National Committee and Clinton campaign 
chairman John Podesta to Wikileaks at strategic moments 
during the campaign cycle, the Russian influence campaign 
relied heavily on social media channels.24  The Internet Research 
Agency (IRA), a Russian entity with ties to the Kremlin,25 hired 
hundreds of “trolls”26 to post fake news and socially divisive 
content on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and other platforms.27  
Facebook reported that the IRA posted content that reached 
over 140 million of its users.28 
The Department of Justice (DOJ) appointed Special 
Counsel Robert Mueller in May 2017 to investigate, among 
other things, Russian interference in the 2016 presidential 
election and any links or coordination between the Russian 
                                               
21 Id. at 1. 
22 The Alliance for Securing Democracy is a bipartisan, transatlantic 
initiative, housed at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, that 
“develops comprehensive strategies to defend against, deter, and raise the 
costs on Russian and other state actors’ efforts to undermine democracy and 
democratic institutions.”  About Us, ALLIANCE FOR SECURING DEMOCRACY, 
https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/K4GX-3DYY].  
The Alliance works to publicly document and expose Vladimir Putin’s ongoing 
efforts to subvert democracy in the United States and Europe.  Id. 
23 Nina Jankowicz, The Top Three Trends We Miss When Discussing 
Russian Ads, ALLIANCE FOR SECURING DEMOCRACY (May 15, 2018), 
http://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/blog/2018/05/15/top-three-trends-we-
miss-when-discussing-russian-ads [https://perma.cc/6UST-AXTL]. 
24 Jarred Prier, Commanding the Trend: Social Media as Information 
Warfare, 11 STRATEGIC STUD. Q. 50, 72 (2017). 
25 Adrian Chen, The Agency, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 2, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html [https:// 
perma.cc/8DRS-BJML]. 
26 “Trolls” refers to people who disrupt online interactions with 
antagonistic and offensive rhetoric and posts.  Id. 
27 Jonathan Masters, Russia, Trump and the 2016 U.S. Election, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/back 
grounder/russia-trump-and-2016-us-election [https://perma.cc/R8TM-GQ82]. 
28 Id. 
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government and the Trump campaign.29  Mueller’s February 
2018 indictment of three Russian agencies, including the IRA, 
and thirteen Russian individuals spells out the scope of the 
operation.30  The indicted Russian defendants allegedly covertly 
operated social media accounts, bought political advertise-
ments, and staged political rallies in the United States.31  The 
indictment states that the defendants allegedly created false 
American personas and operated social media pages and 
groups designed to attract American audiences.32  They also 
allegedly stole identities of real Americans to post on IRA-
controlled social media accounts, buy political advertisements, 
and promote political rallies on social media.33  By 2016, these 
fake social groups had gained hundreds of thousands of 
followers.34  For example, the IRA-created Twitter handle 
@Ten_GOP, which stood for “Tennessee GOP,” obtained over 
100,000 online followers.35   
According to the indictment’s allegations, the IRA 
employed hundreds of staff in support of its online operation36—
by 2015, Russia had hired hundreds of staff at the IRA “troll 
farm” in St. Petersburg, Russia, to disseminate false information 
over the Internet using false identities.37  IRA employees, known 
as “specialists,” were “directed to create ‘political intensity 
through supporting radical groups, users dissatisfied with 
[the] social and economic situation and oppositional social 
movements.’”38  The specialists created thematic groups on social 
media sites such as Facebook and Instagram, covering a cross-
                                               
29 ROD J. ROSENSTEIN, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GEN., 
ORDER NO. 3915-2017, APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL COUNSEL TO INVESTIGATE 
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE WITH THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND RELATED 
MATTERS (2017). 
30 Indictment, supra note 12. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. ¶ 4. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. ¶ 34. 
35 Andrew Prokop, 23 Tweets from @TEN_GOP, One Russian-Run 
Twitter Account Mentioned in Mueller’s New Indictment, VOX (Feb. 16, 
2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/10/19/16504510/ten-
gop-twitter-russia [https://perma.cc/DYA7-CB3Z]. 
36 Indictment, supra note 12, ¶ 10a. 
37 Chen, supra note 25.  One Russian newspaper estimated that the 
IRA had 400 employees and a budget of $400,000 per month.  Id. 
38 Indictment, supra note 12, ¶ 33. 
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section of hot-button social issues, including immigration, with 
group names like “Secured Borders”; the Black Lives Matter 
(BLM) movement, with group names including “Blacktivist”; 
and religion, with group names such as “United Muslims of 
America” and “Army of Jesus.”39  IRA managers guided 
employees on posts to increase their social media influence40 
and trained staff on the nuances of American social issues like 
LGBTQ rights and gun rights.41  By 2016, IRA specialists were 
further directed to make posts supporting Donald Trump and 
Bernie Sanders while criticizing Hillary Clinton.42 
The intelligence agents had a thorough understanding 
of the important role that minority turnout would play in the 
election.  By mid-2016, the IRA began an active campaign 
through social media to suppress minority voter turnout.  For 
example, in the Instagram group “Woke Blacks,” the IRA posted: 
“[A] particular hype and hatred for Trump is misleading the 
people and forcing Blacks to vote Killary.  We cannot resort to 
the lesser of two devils.  Then we’d surely be better off without 
voting AT ALL.”43  The specialists also posted the following 
through their Blacktivist group on Instagram: “Choose peace 
and vote for Jill Stein.  Trust me, it’s not a wasted vote.”44  On 
Election Day, in the IRA-controlled United Muslims of America 
social media account, specialists posted: “American Muslims 
[are] boycotting elections today, most of the American Muslim 
voters refuse to vote for Hillary Clinton because she wants to 
continue the war on Muslims in the middle east and voted yes 
for invading Iraq.”45 
Mueller agreed with the prior conclusion of the intelli-
gence community—the aim of the Russian cyber disinformation 
campaign was to sow discord in the American electoral process.46  
The IRA had specifically referred to itself as engaging in “in-
                                               
39 Id. ¶ 34. 
40 Id. ¶ 38. 
41 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 115TH CONG., 
PUTIN’S ASYMMETRIC ASSAULT ON DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA AND EUROPE: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 45 (Comm. Print 2018) [hereinafter 
SFRC REPORT]. 
42 Indictment, supra note 12, ¶ 43. 
43 Id. ¶ 46a. 
44 Id. ¶ 46b. 
45 Id. ¶ 46c. 
46 Id. ¶ 6. 
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formation warfare” against the United States, and the IRA’s 
stated goal was to spread “distrust towards the candidates and 
the political system in general.”47  An IRA staffer reported, ‘‘Our 
goal wasn’t to turn the Americans toward Russia . . . [o]ur task 
was to set Americans against their own government: to provoke 
unrest and discontent . . . .’’48   
Americans unwittingly assisted the Russian specialists 
in carrying out their program.49  Specialists targeted BLM 
activists because of the racially divided response to the BLM 
anti-police-brutality movement in the United States.  Russian 
news outlet RBC’s investigations revealed that Russian spe-
cialists recruited Black activists on Facebook to organize BLM 
rallies and self-defense classes and to produce content for 
Russian-owned sites denouncing police brutality.50  When 
contacted, activists disclosed that they had no idea they were 
supporting a Russian scheme.51  Two IRA-affiliated sites, Black 
Matters US and Black Fist, contacted Black activists such as 
Conrad James, a rally organizer, and Omowale Adewale, a 
mixed martial artist and trainer.52  The Russians paid James 
to coordinate two political rallies in North Carolina and Adewale 
to arrange self-defense classes for the Black community on 
behalf of the IRA-created Black Fist group.  Unbeknownst to 
these activists, Russia hoped to stoke societal fear of perceived 
Black militancy through coverage of BLM events.53 
Russian operatives also collaborated with White na-
tionalist groups and used other unwitting White nationalists to 
stir their racially divisive messages online.  Andrew Anglin, the 
American publisher of the Daily Stormer, which is the world’s 
largest neo-Nazi website, spent 2015 in Russia promoting his 
                                               
47 Id. ¶¶ 10c–10e.  
48 An Ex St. Petersburg “Troll” Speaks Out: Russian Independent 
TV Network Interviews Former Troll at the Internet Research Agency, 
MEDUZA (Oct. 15, 2017), https://meduza.io/en/feature/2017/10/15/an-ex-st-
petersburg-troll-speaks-out [https://perma.cc/QXV7-BT4Z]. 
49 Indictment, supra note 12, ¶¶ 51–57. 
50 Sidney Fussell, Russia Deceived Black Activists into Aiding Their 
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racist rhetoric utilizing Russian bots.54  This collaboration 
aligned with Russia’s strategy to support far-right nationalist 
groups in Western democracies.55  Russia’s expedition of racial 
division persisted after the 2016 election—Congressman Tom 
Garrett reported the FBI’s conclusion that Russia continued 
to divide Americans along racial lines by inciting such divisions 
at the 2017 Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia.56  
The same fake Russian social media networks that infiltrated 
the 2016 election amplified divisive right-wing extremist rhet-
oric after Charlottesville by posting right-wing extremist 
rhetoric and conspiracy theories on social media.57 
Racial division was fundamental to Russia’s interference 
campaign.  More than half of the Russian advertisements on 
Facebook, for example, used race as a central theme to sow 
disunion.58  Facebook supplied 3000 advertisements from the 
IRA and Russian troll farms to congressional investigators, 
many of which employed racist tropes intending to influence 
the American public.59  Facebook was particularly vulnerable 
to a strategic advertisement operation because its self-service 
advertisement model permits users to create their own 
advertisements and target recipients based on geography, 
demographics, and specific interests.60  This capacity allowed 
                                               
54 Luke O’Brien, The Making of an American Nazi, ATLANTIC (Dec. 
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/12/the-making-
of-an-american-nazi/544119/ [https://perma.cc/2DVZ-JTJ5]. 
55 Casey Michel, Inside Russia’s Alliance with White Nationalists 
Across the Globe, THINKPROGRESS (Oct. 15, 2017), https://thinkprogress. 
org/interview-russia-the-far-right-f3fd27ceb928/ [https://perma.cc/5LL4-
4MCV]. 
56 Deirdre Shesgreen, GOP Lawmaker: Russian Meddling Stirred 
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[https://perma.cc/S5CS-WD6Q]. 
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60 Dylan Byers, Exclusive: Russian-Bought Black Lives Matter Ad 
on Facebook Targeted Baltimore and Ferguson, CNN (Sept. 28, 2017), http:// 
204 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW [Vol. 9:2 
 
the Russian agents to sow political and racial discord in 
particular communities.61  At least one BLM advertisement 
specifically targeted the communities in Baltimore and 
Ferguson, which had experienced widespread protests and 
violent clashes with the police following the police killings of 
two unarmed Black men—Freddie Gray and Michael Brown, 
respectively.62  One Russian-created Facebook page, posing as 
a Muslim rights organization, attracted over 268,000 followers 
and posted an advertisement accusing Senator John McCain 
and Secretary Clinton of funding the terrorist groups ISIS and 
Al-Qaeda.63  Another advertisement, displaying Black women 
with guns protesting police brutality, was designed to stoke 
fear of an armed BLM uprising.64  
The Congressional Black Caucus held hearings with 
Facebook COO Sheryl Sandberg in October 2017 to impress 
on Facebook the need to counteract the thousands of Russian 
advertisements on Facebook, which were devised to negatively 
influence public sentiment regarding social justice movements 
like BLM.65  Congressman Andre Carson also emphasized the 
effect that Russian advertisements can have on U.S. government 
action.  He noted the August 2017 revelation by Foreign Policy 
Magazine of an FBI intelligence report predicting premeditated 
attacks against the police by “[B]lack identity extremists,” and 
expressed concern that the Russian advertisements were 
creating a narrative that the FBI would adopt.66 
Democrats on the House Intelligence Committee re-
leased over 3500 political advertisements posted by the Russians 
                                               
money.cnn.com/2017/09/27/media/facebook-black-lives-matter-targeting/ 
index.html [https://perma.cc/5DWL-8QYQ].  Facebook allows creators of 
advertisements to target their advertisements at core audiences, including 
groups defined by location or demographics such as age, race, gender, and 
political views.  See Find Your Audience: Your Next Customers Are Here, 
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to demonstrate the scope of Russian intrusion on social media.67  
Russia’s agenda to propagate social division in the 2018 election 
was evident by the fact that many of the more than 3500 
political advertisements produced on Facebook and Instagram 
did not support individual candidates, but rather focused on 
hot-button social issues such as police brutality, immigration, 
LGBTQ rights, and gun rights.68  Viewed in totality, it became 
clear that the Russians produced advertisements with diamet-
rically opposed positions on the same social issues with the 
goal of inflaming divisions in American society.69  Facebook 
estimates that the political advertisements were viewed by 
more than ten million Americans during the 2016 election 
campaign.70   
In addition to the 3500 political advertisements already 
released, Democrats on the House Intelligence Committee 
have promised to publish some of the more than 80,000 organic 
posts on Facebook and 120,000 organic posts on Instagram 
that reached over 146 million Americans.71  These posts also 
used racial controversies to exacerbate divisions.  For example, 
Russian agents were responsible for generating the impression 
that mass violence was occurring on the University of Missouri 
campus in the midst of peaceful student protests about the 
treatment of African Americans.72  The false allegations went 
viral and people on the campus feared that a violent uprising 
had occurred.73  
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) 
commissioned two reports on Russian interference in the 
election based on the materials submitted to them by social 
media companies.  Draft copies of the reports were released 
publicly in December 2018.74  Both relied on information sub-
                                               
67 Issie Lapowsky, House Democrats Release 3,500 Russia-Linked 





70 Nitasha Tiku, How Russia “Pushed Our Buttons” with Fake 
Online Ads, WIRED (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/how-russia-
pushed-our-buttons-with-fake-online-ads/ [https://perma.cc/XAK6-WEGU]. 
71 Lapowsky, supra note 67.  
72 Prier, supra note 24, at 68–70. 
73 Id. 
74 Dilanian & Popken, supra note 1. 
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mitted to the SSCI by Facebook, Twitter, and Google as well 
as social media data delivered from additional sources.75  
Together, the two studies constitute the most comprehensive 
analysis to date of IRA activity on social media platforms 
during the 2016 presidential election and beyond.  The first 
report, The IRA, Social Media and Political Polarization in the 
United States, 2012-2018, produced by the University of 
Oxford and Graphika, assessed that between 2015 and 2017, 
thirty million users shared Facebook and Instagram posts 
composed by the IRA.76  The report also determined that the 
IRA campaign was designed to polarize the American public 
and to interfere in the election by: (1) encouraging African 
Americans to boycott the election or use incorrect voting 
procedures, (2) encouraging Latinx voters to distrust American 
institutions, (3) encouraging extreme right-wing voters to be 
more confrontational, and (4) spreading sensationalist, con-
spiratorial, and false information to voters across the political 
spectrum.77 
The second report, The Tactics and Tropes of the Internet 
Research Agency, compiled by New Knowledge, revealed that 
the Russian cyber disinformation scheme was much more 
prominent on Instagram than had previously been reported 
and that the IRA began to shift its activity to Instagram in 
2017 after the media began reporting on their Facebook and 
Twitter operations.78  The New Knowledge report concluded 
that the most prolific element of the Russian cyber operation 
specifically targeted the African American community by re-
cruiting Black audiences79 through the promotion of authentic 
Black media.80  The social media campaign also targeted Black 
audiences for voter suppression through malicious misdirection, 
candidate support redirection, and turnout depression.  The 
report concluded that active and ongoing Russian cyber 
                                               
75 RENEE DIRESTA ET AL., NEW KNOWLEDGE, THE TACTICS AND 
TROPES OF THE INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY 8 (2018) [hereinafter NEW 
KNOWLEDGE REPORT]; PHILIP N. HOWARD ET AL., THE IRA, SOCIAL MEDIA AND 
POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2012–2018, at 3 (2018). 
76 HOWARD ET AL., supra note 75, at 3. 
77 Id. 
78 NEW KNOWLEDGE REPORT, supra note 75, at 8. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
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operations continued after the 2016 election cycle to the present 
day.81 
On March 22, 2019, Special Counsel Mueller submitted 
his final report on the investigation of Russian interference in 
the 2016 presidential election, collusion by President Donald 
Trump’s campaign, and presidential obstruction of justice to 
the Attorney General.82  Attorney General Barr released a 
four-page summary of the report, which stated that the report 
determined that Russia had engaged in an insidious effort to 
influence the 2016 election by (1) spreading disinformation 
and sowing social discord through social media and (2) hack-
ing the e-mail accounts of the Clinton campaign and DNC 
officials and releasing them through Wikileaks and other 
intermediaries.83  Although Mueller indicted several Russian 
individuals and entities for election interference, his investi-
gation did not find sufficient evidence to charge Trump 
campaign officials with conspiracy to support the Russian 
effort.84  Barr also stated that Mueller was unable to reach a 
determination on the question of obstruction of justice and 
that accordingly, Barr made his own conclusion that the 
record was insufficient to substantiate obstruction of justice 
charges.85  In response to a request from Congress to release 
                                               
81 Id. at 7. 
82 Sharon LaFraniere & Katie Benner, Mueller Delivers Report on 
Trump-Russia Investigation to Attorney General, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/22/us/politics/mueller-report.html 
[https://perma.cc/65YT-TWSE]. 
83 Read Attorney General William Barr’s Summary of the Mueller 




85 Id.  Although Mueller did not make a prosecutorial decision on 
obstruction of justice, his report clearly states that he was also not clearing 
the president of wrongdoing.  Instead, the report lays out several instances 
in which the president appeared to have obstructed justice and the legal 
rationale for how Congress could so find.  See 2 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 8 (2019) [hereinafter “Mueller Report Vol. 2”].  
Mueller likely decided to leave this decision to Congress, as he was unable 
to indict a sitting president under longstanding Justice Department policy.  
See id. at 1 (“The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) has issued an opinion 
finding that ‘the indictment or criminal prosecution of a sitting President 
would impermissibly undermine the capacity of the executive branch to 
perform its Constitutionally assigned functions’. Given the role of the Special
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the full report,86 Barr issued a redacted version to Congress 
and the public on April 18, 2019.87   
The Mueller report detailed the scope of the Russian 
interference campaign.  It found that the IRA had hundreds of 
thousands of American participants in its Facebook groups 
and on its Instagram accounts.88  The IRA’s Facebook accounts 
alone reached over 126 million people.89  Similarly, the IRA 
controlled over 3800 Twitter accounts that had thousands of 
American followers, including several United States political 
leaders, and may have reached over 1.4 million people.90  
Several high profile figures retweeted information from IRA 
accounts, and the media reported on tweets from IRA accounts 
as if they were posted by Americans.91  Regarding the Russian 
online interference campaign, the Mueller report noted that 
although thirteen Russian individuals and three Russian 
entities, including the IRA, had been indicted by a Washington, 
D.C. federal grand jury, the defendants remained at large.92  
Though Mueller was limited in his investigation to 
studying the scope of Russian election interference in the 2016 
campaign, media and expert analysis reveal that Russia 
attempted to interfere in the 2018 midterm elections93 and is 
most likely already interfering in the 2020 presidential election 
cycle, as of the time of this Article.  Cyber analysts are not yet 
able to determine definitively that Russia is the source of the 
                                               
Counsel as an attorney in the Department of Justice . . . this Office accepted 
OLC’s legal conclusion for the purpose of exercising prosecutorial discretion.”). 
86 Press Release, U.S. House Comm. on the Judiciary, House 
Committee Chairs Take Next Step for Release of Full Mueller Report and 
Underlying Evidence (Apr. 2, 2019), https://judiciary.house.gov/news/press-
releases/house-committee-chairs-take-next-step-release-full-mueller-report-
underlying [https://perma.cc/5D2X-M4BU]. 
87 MUELLER REPORT VOL. 1, supra note 16. 
88 Id. at 15. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 27–28. 
92 Id. at 174.  The only litigation following the indictment involved 
one of the indicted Russian entities, Concord Management and Consulting 
LLC, which moved to have its charges dismissed by the District Court for 
the District of Columbia.  Id. 
93 Alex Ward, The 2018 Midterm Election Hasn’t Been Hacked—but 
Russia Is Still Trying to Influence It, VOX (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www. 
vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/11/6/18067756/midterm-election-russia-
hacking-interference-meddling-china-iran [https://perma.cc/F85N-74NU]. 
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foreign cyber campaign targeting 2020 Democratic presidential 
candidates, but they have noted that the attacks share similar 
characteristics with Russia’s IRA troll farm.94  A 2019 investi-
gative study by Politico, assisted by Guardians.ai (a technology 
company that works to disrupt cyberattacks and protect pro-
democracy groups), concluded that bot-like social media ac-
counts had targeted Democratic primary candidates Senator 
Kamala Harris, Senator Elizabeth Warren, Senator Bernie 
Sanders, and former congressman Beto O’Rourke with viral 
attacks involving accusations intended to inflame racial 
division.95  One attack falsely accused Senator Warren of having 
a blackface doll in her kitchen during a New Year’s Eve 
livestream on social media.96  Another cyberattack accused 
Beto O’Rourke of using a racial epithet in a voicemail in the 
1990’s.97  The accounts also utilized racist and sexist stereotypes 
in sensationalizing Senator Harris’s former relationship with 
San Francisco mayor Willie Brown.98  
The goal of the attacks is to undermine candidacies and 
to instigate racial discord within the Democratic primary.99  
Guardians.ai found that a core group of 200 accounts was 
responsible for the attacks, and these same accounts were 
active in spreading disinformation during the 2018 midterm 
election.100  Whether the current disinformation offensive 
against Democratic candidates are proven to originate from 
Russia or from another source, they show that Russia’s strategic 
use of social media platforms to disseminate disinformation 
and drive a wedge among the American public with race-
baiting techniques has become the norm in American election 
cycles.  Current and former American intelligence analysts 
and operatives predict that Russia will extend their cyber 
disinformation campaign into the 2020 election cycle because 
of their successful attempt to stir social division and political 
                                               
94 Natasha Korecki, “Sustained and Ongoing” Disinformation 
Assault Targets Dem Presidential Candidates, POLITICO (Feb. 20, 2019), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/02/20/2020-candidates-social-media-
attack-1176018 [https://perma.cc/G67C-WJHB]. 






210 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW [Vol. 9:2 
 
chaos, as illustrated by the political divide within Congress over 
how to respond to the Mueller report’s release.101  
 
B. Cold War Geopolitics and Race 
Russia’s exploitation of racial divisions in the United 
States did not begin with the 2016 presidential election.  Retired 
brigadier general Bruce McClintock, the former senior defense 
official at the United States Embassy in Moscow, observed 
that the Russian IRA troll farm tactics are in keeping with 
Russia’s past efforts to inflame racial division in the United 
States, including reports that the KGB drafted supposed letters 
from the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and spread various conspiracy 
theories about government involvement in Martin Luther King 
Jr.’s assassination.102     
During the decades-long Cold War that followed World 
War II, Russia regularly used American racial strife for its 
own geopolitical aspirations.  Russia exploited the situation in 
both external and internal ways.  Externally, Russia proffered 
arguments about the moral hypocrisy of a liberal democracy 
that discriminated against minorities.  Internally, Russia sought 
to agitate divisions with disinformation campaigns that built 
on racial tensions—a precursor to its 2016 election interference.   
In January 1948, in a New York Times Magazine article, 
Robert Cushman, a Cornell University professor and member 
of President Truman’s Committee on Civil Rights, summarized 
the implications of racism in America to the post-World War 
II global order: 
 
[T]he nation finds itself the most powerful spokes-
man for the democratic way of life, as opposed 
to the principles of a totalitarian state.  It is 
unpleasant to have the Russians publicize our 
continuing lynchings, our Jim Crow statutes and 
customs, our anti-Semitic discriminations and 
our witch-hunts; but is it underserved? . . . 
[We] cannot deny the truth of the charges; we 
are becoming aware that we do not practice the 
                                               
101 Amy MacKinnon, What the Mueller Report Tells Us About 
Russia’s Designs on 2020, FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 19, 2019), https:// 
foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/19/what-the-mueller-report-tells-us-about-russias-
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civil liberty we preach; and this realization is a 
wholesome thing.103 
 
Similarly, American embassies around the world were forced 
to respond to inquiries and consistent press coverage about 
the mistreatment of African Americans in the United States 
and how it undermined American moral leadership.104  In a 
1949 cable, the United States Embassy in Moscow reported 
that 
  
the “Negro question,” [was] [o]ne of the 
principal Soviet propaganda themes regarding 
the United States. . . . [T]he Soviet press 
hammers away unceasingly on such things as 
“lynch law,” segregation, racial discrimination, 
deprivation of political rights, etc., seeking to 
build up a picture of an America in which the 
Negroes are brutally downtrodden with no 
hope of improving their status under the existing 
form of government.105 
 
Senator William Benton warned his Senate colleagues that 
Soviet propaganda regarding American racism was greatest 
in those countries that were caught between the Cold War 
philosophies of American democracy and Soviet communism: 
“[T]he fate of mankind may be decided . . . in Latin America, 
in Germany, and the Slavic countries of Europe, among the 
dark-skinned nations of Africa and southeast Asia, and among 
the yellow skinned peoples on the Asiatic mainland and the 
nearby island areas.”106  Russian Cold War propaganda sought 
to convince states emerging from colonialism that American 
liberal democracy was flawed and that aligning with the 
Soviet Union would better serve their interests.  Today, Russian 
propaganda seeks to undermine Western governments and their 
                                               
103 DUDZIAK, supra note 4, at 29 (quoting Robert E. Cushman, Our 
Civil Rights Become a World Issue, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 12, 1948, at 12); 
Dudziak, supra note 11; see also Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of 
Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 
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105 Id. at 38. 
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democratic institutions from within, and with the growth of 
social media, they have found the perfect platform to do so.  
 
C. Racial Polarization as a Global Strategy  
Russia’s race-baiting and online proliferation of societal 
division in the 2016 United States presidential election is not 
only part of a long-standing geopolitical strategy to undermine 
the authority of the United States, but is also a key element of 
Russia’s intent to pursue its interests in states globally.  Russia 
has been particularly active in foreign influence campaigns in 
Europe for over two decades.107  The first wave involved Russian 
intervention in former Soviet states following the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union in 1991.108  The second wave began in 2014, 
when Russia began to intervene in Western European demo-
cratic elections.109  A 2018 Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
minority staff report on Russian attacks on democracy in the 
United States and Europe observed that  
 
[i]n consolidated democracies within the EU and 
NATO, the Russian government seeks to under-
mine support for sanctions against Russia, 
interfere in elections through overt or covert 
support of sympathetic political parties and the 
spread of disinformation, and sow discord and 
confusion by exacerbating existing social and 
political divisions through disinformation and 
cultivated ideological groups.110  
 
A key component of Russia’s foreign election interference in 
Europe is the sowing of racial, ideological, and societal discord 
through cyber disinformation campaigns, just as it does in the 
United States.111  The Kremlin views the fostering of internal 
division in democratic states as a low-cost, high-reward tool for 
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splitting its adversaries and undermining faith in democratic 
institutions.112  The expansion of the fairly unregulated social 
media space, where most individuals now consume their news, 
has created an ideal platform for Russia’s division endeavor.113  
Immediately prior to, during, and after the 2016 presidential 
election, Russia’s cyber disinformation campaigns in Europe fo-
cused on social issues specific to the countries that they targeted, 
such as extreme nationalism, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, 
xenophobia, and neo-Nazism in Austria, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, and Latvia.114  Russia sought maximum division 
by supporting ideologically opposed groups and viewpoints on 
both the right and left of the political spectrum.115  Though 
Russian intervention may be challenged by expanded regulation 
of social media, discussed in Part VII, this Article advocates for 
the proactive minimization of state practices in the United 
States that create fertile ground for Russia’s tactics.  Such an 
approach would achieve antidiscrimination and national 
security goals that are in the interest of the American public. 
 
III. NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST CONVERGENCE 
Legal scholar Derrick Bell famously argued that civil 
rights advances for African Americans in the courts did not 
occur merely because legal advocates were able to convince 
courts that those advances were just or required by the 
Constitution.116  He advanced the argument that civil rights 
legal victories such as Brown v. Board of Education instead 
reflected an “interest convergence” of the civil rights aims of 
the African American community with the broader interests 
of the demographic majority in the mid-twentieth century.117  
Bell contended that African Americans had been challenging 
the insufficiency of inferior and segregated public schools for 
African American children for a century prior to Brown, yet 
those challenges had never resulted in a determination that 
the Constitution or the post-Civil War Equal Protection Clause 
                                               
112 Id. at 1. 
113 Id. at 6. 
114 Id. at 50–51. 
115 Id. at 52–53. 
116 Bell, Jr., supra note 103, at 523. 
117 Id. (“The interest of [B]lacks in achieving racial equality will be 
accommodated only when it converges with the interests of [W]hites.”). 
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required integrated schools.118  In Bell’s view, racial progress 
in the form of integrated schools occurred only when it was 
perceived to be in the interests of the racial majority. 
Bell argued that the Brown decision must be understood 
in light of its benefit not only to African Americans, but also to 
the White community—particularly policymakers who under-
stood the political and economic benefits at home and abroad 
that would come with desegregation.119  Foreign policy elites 
understood the damage that oppression of African Americans 
had inflicted on the United States’ reputation abroad, especially 
as it battled the Communist Soviet Union for influence in newly 
independent countries emerging from colonialism and populated 
by people of color.120  Federal government lawyers joined the 
NAACP in advancing this Cold War argument to the Supreme 
Court.121  The United States’ amicus brief in Brown stated: 
 
It is in the context of the present world struggle 
between freedom and tyranny that the problem 
of racial discrimination must be viewed. . . . [for] 
discrimination against minority groups in the 
United States has an adverse effect upon our 
relations with other countries.  Racial discrimina-
tion furnishes grist for the Communist propa-
ganda mills, and it raises doubts even among 
friendly nations as to the intensity of our devotion 
to the democratic faith.122 
 
Professor Sudha Setty adopts Bell’s interest convergence frame-
work in arguing that legislators are not likely to protect margin-
alized groups from national security abuse if such action might 
be perceived as soft on counterterrorism by mainstream constit-
uencies—unless the legislators are provided with an interest 
that is more palatable to those communities.123  This Article 
                                               
118 Id. at 523–24 (citing Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. 198 
(1850) (an early challenge to inferior public schools for African Americans)). 
119 Id. at 524. 
120 Id.; Dudziak, supra note 11, at 118. 
121 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racial Remediation: An Historical 
Perspective on Current Conditions, 52 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 5, 12 (1976). 
122 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Brown v. Bd. 
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Nos. 1, 2, 4, 10). 
123 See Sudha Setty, National Security Interest Convergence, 4 
HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 185, 206, 225 (2012). 
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posits that the inoculation of American democratic processes 
from foreign exploitation by reducing institutional discrimination 
is such a converged national security interest. 
In order to demonstrate how the advancement of anti-
discrimination and national security interests converge in the 
present moment, it is necessary to define with specificity the 
converging interests.  National security, broadly defined, en-
compasses the protection of the American people, government, 
homeland, infrastructure, and economic system from domestic 
and foreign threats.124  National security institutions comprise 
those state agencies charged with this task, including but not 
limited to: at the federal level, the Department of Defense 
(DOD), the DOJ, the FBI, the CIA, and the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS); and, at the state and local level, 
prosecutor offices, police departments, and law enforcement 
agencies.125  Historically, national security institutions and their 
leadership—at both the national and local level—reflected the 
values and beliefs of dominant American culture and helped pro-
tect racially oppressive practices (such as slavery and Jim Crow 
laws) for nearly 200 years following American independence.126  
                                               
124 For the purpose of this Article, I adopt a definition of national 
security similar to “the protection of the state and its citizens [from internal 
and external threats] through a variety of means, including military might, 
economic power, diplomacy, and power projection.”  Functions of Bureaucracy, 
LUMEN LEARNING, https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundless-political 
science/chapter/functions-of-bureaucracy/ [https://perma.cc/P6MW-9U9M]. 
125 The National Security Act of 1947 created many of the national 
security institutions that exist today, including the National Security 
Council, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the 
Central Intelligence Agency.  National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-
253, §§ 101–211, 61 Stat. 495, 496–505 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 3001 (2018)).  Other national security institutions, such as the Department 
of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, preceded the National 
Security Act.  The Federal Bureau of Investigation was created on July 26, 
1908, by memorandum of Attorney General Charles Bonaparte.  See A Brief 
History: The Nation Calls, 1908-1923, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATIONS, 
https://www.fbi.gov/history/brief-history [https://perma.cc/XD5L-CMYV].  
Other institutions, such as the Department of Homeland Security, were 
created much later.  The Department of Homeland Security was created by 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.  
Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 
126 As discussed in Part IV, national and local political, judicial, 
military, and law enforcement forces sustained slavery and Jim Crow 
practices by passing and enforcing laws that made racial subordination a 
way of life for African Americans for nearly 200 years (475 years if slavery 
during the pre-Independence colonial era is included). 
216 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW [Vol. 9:2 
 
It was only in the latter half of the twentieth century that the 
African American community and allies successfully forced a 
conception of national security that encompassed the elimina-
tion of de jure segregation and race-based disenfranchisement.127  
From its founding, the security and success of the 
American democratic project was inextricably linked to its 
treatment of African Americans.  The national security of the 
United States has been enhanced each time racially oppressive 
practices have been eliminated because the social division, 
and resulting violence, arising from the enforcement of and 
opposition to those institutions have ceased.  This Article argues 
that American national security interests encompass the 
protection of democratic institutions and electoral processes 
from foreign intervention.  Russia’s cyber disinformation 
campaign has sought to externally influence and destabilize 
American electoral processes by exploiting racial grievances 
and fostering racial polarization.128  The advancement of an 
antidiscrimination agenda focused on the retrenchment of 
institutional discrimination would alleviate a significant source 
of racial grievances for minority community members and 
reduce the opportunities for foreign exploitation of those legiti-
mate grievances.  Modern-day forms of institutional discrimina-
tion in national security institutions include such practices as 
racial profiling, broken windows over-policing, law enforcement 
killings of unarmed African Americans, race and identity-
based investigative programs, and discriminatory immigration 
enforcement practices.129  These practices, controlled by federal 
and local security institutions, have negative racial impacts in 
minority communities that create fertile ground for foreign 
exploitation.130  The convergence of these two agendas—
                                               
127 As seen in segregated national institutions such as the Armed 
Forces and the federal civil service, segregation was not merely a southern 
issue, but a national one.  Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and 
the Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499, 520–21 (1991). 
128 See discussion supra Part II. 
129 For a discussion on immigration policies, see infra Section VI.A.  
For a discussion on racial profiling after 9/11, see infra Section IV.B. 
130 See, e.g., Lenese C. Herbert, Bête Noire: How Race-Based 
Policing Threatens National Security, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 149, 156 (2003) 
(“Race-based policing guts the expectation of fair-dealing, legitimacy, and 
justice in the criminal justice system, creating marginalized populations, 
especially of African Americans.  Lack of judicial redress in the face of 
such policing irrevocably stains already beleaguered African Americans 
(and others so policed) as inferior citizens.  This, in turn, may actualize a 
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eliminating institutional discrimination and mitigating foreign 
intervention in electoral processes—calls for a national security 
project that places antidiscrimination at its core.131  
 
IV. A RACE AS THREAT NATIONAL SECURITY APPROACH 
America’s unfortunate historical treatment of race has 
always affected its broader national security given that its 
formation relied upon both slavery and the brutal conquest of 
Native Americans, which created the seeds for deep internal 
and external rifts.  Throughout the nineteenth and early twenti-
eth century, wars (collectively called the “American Indian 
Wars”) were fought against Native Americans for territory, 
and slave rebellions were violently suppressed by American 
soldiers and state militias.132  The national security of the state 
became synonymous with the maintenance of a status quo 
that maintained minority oppression.  Laws were instituted to 
maintain control of both slaves and Native Americans as well 
                                               
catalyst of cooperative opportunity and vulnerability for those who seek to 
injure the United States, its institutions, and its people.”); see also supra 
Part II. 
131 Private racial discrimination, like institutional discrimination, 
has a negative impact on the experiences of minorities in the United States 
that creates the opportunity for foreign racial exploitation.  Though anti-
discrimination law, and robust enforcement of that law, can mitigate private 
discrimination, private viewpoint discrimination cannot be eliminated by 
the state.  This Article, therefore, focuses on the prevention of institutional 
discrimination.  Specifically, it focuses on discrimination by security 
institutions because institutional practices are those most within the 
capacity of the state to prevent, and institutional discrimination has a 
sweeping impact on minority communities.  As discussed in Part VI, racism 
should be framed as a national security threat in order to advance American 
foreign policy goals and to safeguard electoral processes.  Such a framing is 
also likely to garner the support of a broader community of citizens for new 
anti-discrimination measures. 
132 The post-independence American Indian Wars encompassed 
conflict from the Cherokee-American Wars of 1776 to 1794 through the wars 
on the Western frontier, including the Apache Wars of 1849 to 1924.  
Historian Herbert Aptheker identified more than 250 slave revolts and 
planned revolts in his pioneering study, American Negro Slave Revolts, 
including Gabriel Prosser’s slave rebellion of 1800, Denmark Vesey’s slave 
revolt of 1822, and Nat Turner’s Rebellion of 1831.  Herbert Aptheker, 
American Negro Slave Revolts, 1 SCI. & SOC’Y 512, 537 (1937); see also Slave 
Rebellions: A Timeline, PBS, www.pbs.org/independentlens/natturner/ 
slave_rebellions.html [https://perma.cc/PR57-8M6N].  Prosser, Vesey, and 
Turner’s slave rebellions occurred during the timeframe Aptheker analyzed. 
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as new migrants from China.  The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850,133 
the Indian Removal Act of 1830,134 and the Chinese Exclusion 
Act of 1882135 all sought to maintain the status quo—African 
Americans in bondage, Native Americans conquered and iso-
lated, and immigrant Chinese laborers denied citizenship.  
However, these policies of racial oppression themselves 
threatened American national security and stability because 
they divided the nation.  Ultimately, the stability and security 
of the United States was shattered by the Civil War between 
Northern and Southern states fought over the institution of 
slavery.136  Following the Civil War, in which 750,000 lives 
were lost,137 a new status quo was envisioned by the Union 
Congress, which approved post-war constitutional amendments 
guaranteeing African Americans freedom, citizenship, equal 
protection of the laws, and the right to vote.138  Despite these 
constitutional changes, a century of Jim Crow segregation and 
racial terror against African Americans soon commenced. 
 
A. Race as Threat 
During the pre-Civil War period, the political leadership 
of the nation considered the freedom and equality of African 
Americans and other minorities as antithetical to their vision 
of national security.  National security meant stability of the 
status quo, which included protection of a system of racial 
superiority that oppressed minority groups.  Racial equality 
was a threat to that status quo.  Because racial minorities would 
continue to fight and advocate for their freedom and equality, 
they themselves became dangerous to this view of national 
security: minority race became a threat.  This conception of 
                                               
133 Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (repealed 1864). 
134 Indian Removal Act of 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411. 
135 Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58. (repealed 
1943).   
136 Tony Horwitz, 150 Years of Misunderstanding the Civil War, 
ATLANTIC (June 19, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/ 
2013/06/150-years-of-misunderstanding-the-civil-war/277022/ [https:// 
perma.cc/RX6W-5NXP] (“[T]he Civil War claimed more lives than all other 
American wars combined . . . .”). 
137 Daniel Nasaw, Who, What, Why: How Many Soldiers Died in the 
US Civil War?, BBC (Apr. 4, 2012), https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-
17604991 [https://perma.cc/6V4L-DUL2]. 
138 U.S. CONST. amends. XIII–XIV, XV. 
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race as threat persists today.  In the century that followed the 
Civil War, American national security institutions engaged in 
actions that reflected this race as threat typology. 
 
1. Jim Crow 
Following the Civil War,139 there was no community in 
greater need of state protection than the African American 
community, which faced a racial terror campaign by the KKK 
and southern segregationists.  From the end of the Civil War 
through the mid-twentieth century, white supremacist groups 
such as the KKK, the White League in Louisiana, the White 
Man’s Party in Alabama, and the South Carolina Red Shirts 
formed and engaged in terror plots in Black communities 
throughout the country—lynchings, murders, and rapes oc-
curred against Black citizens with impunity.140  With the 
Compromise of 1877, President Hayes removed federal troops 
from the South, effectively ending Reconstruction and leaving 
newly freed Black people to the mercy of these terror groups, 
which were supported by state agents.141  Sheriffs, judges, and 
mayors enforced the newly formed Black Codes, which extended 
                                               
139 The Supreme Court infamously determined in the Dred Scott 
case that African Americans were not citizens, even if born in the country.  
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by 
constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  This view certainly 
reflected the policy of the times.  African Americans were not citizens and 
were therefore “others” not entitled to the national security protection of the 
state.  In fact, as potential “spoilers” of the system of racial dominance and 
chattel slavery, they were threats to the state as it was conceived.  The 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments sought to rectify the Supreme 
Court’s pronouncement: former slaves were now free and citizens and 
presumably deserving of the national security protection of the state. 
140 William Y. Chin, Domestic Counterinsurgency: How 
Counterinsurgency Tactics Combined with Laws Were Deployed Against 
Blacks Throughout U.S. History, 3 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 31, 
47–48 (2013). 
141 See generally NICHOLAS LEMANN, REDEMPTION: THE LAST BATTLE 
OF THE CIVIL WAR 184–85 (2006) (describing the state-led creation of the Jim 
Crow system in former Confederate states that replaced the previously 
“informal and violent nullification of Negro rights”); C. VANN WOODWARD, 
REUNION AND REACTION:  THE COMPROMISE OF 1877 AND THE END OF 
RECONSTRUCTION (1966) (discussing how the Compromise of 1877 brought 
Reconstruction to an end and how African Americans feared the withdrawal 
of federal protection).  See also Steve Hahn, Homegrown Terror, NEW 
REPUBLIC (Nov. 20, 2006), https://newrepublic.com/article/63909/home 
grown-terror [https://perma.cc/F24R-HVNC]. 
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slavery’s prohibition of African Americans’ right to own 
property, receive an education, and enter into contracts or 
enforce rights and later became institutionalized throughout 
the South as Jim Crow segregation.142  Appeals to the state for 
national security protection for African Americans fell on deaf 
ears as federal troops withdrew from the South and defeated 
Confederate troops waged their terror campaign against 
African Americans as elected officials, state agents, and 
paramilitary hate groups.143  Black Americans were treated as 
threats to the historic system of white supremacy that state 
and local institutions sought to protect through widespread 
racial oppression.144  
From the end of the Civil War until the end of World 
War II, so-called “race riots” resulted in the destruction of 
numerous African American communities.145  These riots were 
actually racial terror schemes visited on Black communities at 
the whim of racist agitators.146  Race riots occurred throughout 
the country in New Orleans, Atlanta, Springfield, East St. 
Louis, Washington, Chicago, Mobile, Beaumont, Detroit, and 
Harlem.147  Rather than treat African Americans as citizens 
                                               
142 Jennifer Mason McAward, Defining the Badges and Incidents of 
Slavery, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 561, 573–74, 573 n.54, 581, 622 (2012) (“The 
‘Black Codes’ were passed by each state of the former confederacy and 
sought to reimpose many of the legal restrictions that had applied to slaves 
prior to emancipation, particularly in relation to the exercise of contractual 
and civil rights.  For example, the codes required the freedmen to make annual 
written contracts for their labor and provided that they would be subject to 
arrest and forfeiture of the entirety of their annual wages if they left before 
the contract's term.  Vagrancy laws were strengthened in an effort to ensure 
that freedmen agreed to such contractual provisions; those who lacked a 
‘home and support’ were subject to arrest and enforced service to pay their 
debts.” (citation omitted)). 
143 Hahn, supra note 141; see also Bell, supra note 11, at 376 
(“Those committed to racial equality also had to overlook the political 
motivations for the Civil War Amendments—self-interest motivations 
almost guaranteeing that when political needs changed, the protection 
provided the former slaves would not be enforced.”). 
144 See Hahn, supra note 141. 
145 For more information about the race riots, see ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
AMERICAN RACE RIOTS (Walter Rucker & Nathaniel Upton eds., 2007). 
146 Chauncey DeVega, White America’s Racial Amnesia: The 




147 Chin, supra note 140, at 46. 
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deserving of national security protection, state institutions 
and agents often failed to intervene or participated in the 
terror against Black communities.148  One of the many tragic 
race riots was the Tulsa Race Riot of 1921, which resulted in 
the destruction of a thriving Black community—known as 
“Black Wall Street”—by a White mob numbering in the 
hundreds.149  An African American lawyer in the community, 
Buck Colbert Franklin, father of famed historian John Hope 
Franklin, provided an eyewitness account:   
 
I could see planes circling in mid-air.  They grew 
in number and hummed, darted and dipped low.  
I could hear something like hail falling upon the 
top of my office building.  Down East Archer, I 
saw the old Mid-Way hotel on fire, burning from 
its top, and then another and another and 
another building began to burn from their top.150 
 
African American and Native American residents of the 
Greenwood neighborhood in Tulsa, Oklahoma had become 
wealthy due to oil reserves that they had discovered on their 
land.151  The wealth of this Black community was conspicuous, 
leading to Greenwood’s nickname of Black Wall Street.152  
Their poorer White neighbors could not abet this success and, 
as recounted by Buck Franklin, nearly a dozen private planes 
air-bombed the community and Blacks were machine-gunned 
                                               
148 See, e.g., CHARLES L. LUMPKINS, AMERICAN POGROM: THE EAST 
ST. LOUIS RACE RIOT AND BLACK POLITICS 1 (2008) (“On July 2 and 3, 1917, 
rampaging white men and women looted and torched black homes and 
businesses and assaulted African Americans in the small industrial city of 
East St. Louis, Illinois.  The mob, which included police officers and National 
Guardsmen, wounded or killed many black residents and terrorized others 
into fleeing the city.”). 
149 DeNeen L. Brown, They Was Killing Black People, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/local/wp/2018/09/ 
28/feature/they-was-killing-black-people/?utm_term=.39c58cd4d78f [https:// 
perma.cc/54UM-QQRR].  
150 Allison Keyes, A Long-Lost Manuscript Contains a Searing 
Eyewitness Account of the Tulsa Race Massacre of 1921, SMITHSONIAN.COM 




152 Brown, supra note 149. 
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down in the street.153  More than thirty-five blocks and 1200 
homes were destroyed, and 300 people, almost all Black, were 
killed.154  When the Governor declared martial law and sent 
in the National Guard to restore calm, any Black person who 
had not already been imprisoned by White mobs and the local 
law enforcement supporting them were then placed in jail by 
the National Guard.155  The National Guard’s actions reinforced 
the position that national security institutions were protectors 
of White citizens—even those engaged in violent activity—and 
the victimized African American community was the enemy.  
White mob violence of this era often led to “racial 
cleansings,” where White mobs drove all of the Black members 
out of entire cities.156  Furthermore, state institutions such as 
local police, sheriffs, politicians, and judges colluded with white 
supremacist groups like the KKK to brutally enforce a century 
of Jim Crow segregation throughout the South (and de facto 
segregation in the North) where Black citizens were denied 
equal education, housing, jobs, and opportunities.157  African 
Americans were effectively treated as security threats by the 
state rather than citizens whose rights deserved protection. 
 
2. Japanese American Internment  
African Americans were not the only racial minority 
treated as a threat by American national security institutions.  
Japanese Americans endured one of the most infamous race-
based national security deprivations of the twentieth century 
at the direction of the highest levels of the United States 
government.  During World War II, the United States military 
forced Japanese Americans, living in a region of California 
and the West Coast designated as a military zone, to abandon 
their homes and relocate to internment camps in the middle 
of the country.158  The military justified relocation on the 
theory that Japanese Americans as a group were subversive 
                                               
153 Keyes, supra note 150. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Chin, supra note 140, at 46–48. 
157 Tara McAndrew, The History of the KKK in American Politics, 
JSTOR DAILY (Jan. 25, 2017), https://daily.jstor.org/history-kkk-american-
politics/ [https://perma.cc/EGV3-T6UH]. 
158 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216–17 (1944). 
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and would share information to assist Japanese enemy forces 
in an attack on the West Coast.159  Congress passed a statute 
making a violation of the military order a criminal offense.160  
More than 110,000 people of Japanese descent (70,000 of 
whom were citizens) were confined to these camps.161  The 
American military did not institute a similar policy for people 
of German descent nor people of Italian descent in the United 
States, notwithstanding the fact that Hitler’s Germany and 
Mussolini’s Italy were also America’s enemies in the war.  
Only Japanese Americans, as a group, were identified as a 
security threat deserving of internment,162 reaffirming the 
view that racial minorities were a security threat to the 
United States. 
Fred Korematsu, a Japanese American citizen, refused 
the internment orders and was convicted of a criminal viola-
tion.163  He challenged his conviction in court, which led to the 
infamous and heavily-criticized Supreme Court Korematsu 
decision.  Writing for the Court, Justice Black stated that 
“Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because 
of hostility to him or his race.  He was excluded because . . . 
the properly constituted military authorities . . . decided that 
the military urgency of the situation demanded that all 
citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West 
Coast temporarily . . . .”164 
In a strongly-worded dissent, Justice Murphy spelled 
out the racially discriminatory views underlying the military 
exclusion orders: 
 
Individuals of Japanese ancestry are condemned 
because they are said to be “a large, unassimi-
lated, tightly knit racial group, bound to an 
enemy nation by strong ties of race, culture, 
custom and religion.”  They are claimed to be 
given to “emperor worshipping ceremonies” and 
to “dual citizenship.” . . . The main reasons 
                                               
159 Id. at 217. 
160 Act of Mar. 21, 1942, ch. 191, 56 Stat. 173 (codified as amended 
at 18 U.S.C. § 97a (Supp. II 1946)); see also Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 228 
(Roberts, J., dissenting). 
161 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 241–42 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
162 Id.  
163 Id. at 215–16 (majority opinion). 
164 Id. at 223. 
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relied upon by those responsible for the forced 
evacuation, therefore, do not prove a reasonable 
relation between the group characteristics of 
Japanese Americans and the dangers of invasion, 
sabotage and espionage.  The reasons appear, 
instead, to be largely an accumulation of 
misinformation . . . that for years ha[s] been 
directed against Japanese Americans by people 
with racial and economic prejudices . . . .  A 
military judgment based upon such racial and 
sociological considerations is not entitled to the 
great weight ordinarily given the judgments 
based upon strictly military considerations.  
Especially is this so when every charge relative 
to race, religion, culture, geographical location, 
and legal and economic status has been substan-
tially discredited by independent studies made by 
experts in these matters.165 
 
Justice Murphy’s dissent reveals the sweeping conclusions 
drawn about the Japanese American community based on 
racial innuendo and discriminatory views, eviscerating any 
sound military judgement involved in the racial exclusion.  
The dissent goes on to note that, in contrast to the treatment 
of Japanese Americans, Americans of German and Italian 
descent who were detained during the War were subject to 
specific individual determinations regarding their subversive 
activity rather than broad, group-based accusations.166  In a 
time of national vulnerability and anxiety following Japan’s 
attack on Pearl Harbor, racial biases and the fear of the 
minority Japanese American race as threat led the country’s 
national security leadership to tarnish once more the 
Constitution’s promise of equal protection.  This pattern 
continued to manifest itself in the ensuing decades. 
 
3. COINTELPRO 
One of the most notorious twentieth century examples 
of a national security institution using its power against the 
African American community was the targeting of civil rights 
leadership by the FBI during the Civil Rights Era.  This 
                                               
165 Id. at 237, 239–40 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). 
166 Id. at 241. 
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activity fell under the rubric of COINTELPRO (shorthand for 
“Counter Intelligence Program”), which was under the direction 
of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover.167  In justifying his targeting 
of these leaders, J. Edgar Hoover famously described the goal 
of the program as “prevent[ing] the rise of a [Black] ‘messiah’ 
. . . .”168  Fear of a Black “messiah” indicates a distorted view 
and fear of race held by the most senior leadership of the 
national security community.   
African Americans, many of whom had just returned to 
America from fighting against Nazism and racial oppression 
abroad during World War II, were continuing their advocacy 
for civil rights and equal protection at home under the leader-
ship of the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP), the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference (SCLC), the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee (SNCC), and the Congress of Racial Equality 
(CORE).  Clergy, student activists, and labor leaders led these 
racial justice organizations.169  These civil rights organizations 
wished to make the promise of the post-Civil War Amendments 
a reality for the African American community.   
However, many civil rights leaders were treated as a 
national security threat to the country.170  The FBI disrupted 
civil rights organizations and aimed to discredit leaders such 
                                               
167 Natsu Taylor Saito, Whose Liberty? Whose Security? The USA 
PATRIOT Act in the Context of COINTELPRO and the Unlawful Repression 
of Political Dissent, 81 OR. L. REV. 1051, 1062, 1094 (2002).  COINTELPRO 
originally began in the early twentieth century as an anti-Communist 
program.  Over the years, the program evolved and applied its tactics to 
Black, Latinx, Native American, and anti-Vietnam War organizers in civil 
rights and liberation organizations.  Id. at 1088, 1090, 1098.  
168 Id. at 1094 (emphasis omitted). 
169 Aldon D. Morris, A Retrospective on the Civil Rights Movement: 
Political and Intellectual Landmarks, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 517, 525 (1999). 
170 The COINTELPRO program targeted Black civil rights organi-
zations and leaders, many of whom were swept up in a broader categorization 
as being Black militant groups or capable of militancy.  Jonathan David 
Farley, Preventing the Rise of a “Messiah,” GUARDIAN  (Apr. 4, 2008), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/apr/04/preventingthe
riseofamessi [https://perma.cc/P2SX-RAJN] (“Hoover issued another 
directive: ‘Prevent the rise of a “messiah” who could unify and electrify the 
militant black nationalist movement.  Malcolm X might have been such a 
“messiah” . . . .  Martin Luther King, Stokely Carmichael, and [Nation of 
Islam leader] Elijah Muhammed [sic] all aspire to this position . . . .  King 
could be a very real contender for this position should he abandon his 
supposed “obedience” to “white, liberal doctrines” (nonviolence).’”).     
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as Martin Luther King Jr., the exemplar of nonviolent 
protest.171  FBI records reveal that the FBI sent an anonymous 
letter to King alleging knowledge of his extramarital affairs 
and encouraging him to commit suicide.172  With Attorney 
General Robert Kennedy’s approval, the FBI wiretapped King 
for several years.173  This action was initially prompted by the 
theory that one of King’s advisers was a prominent member of 
the Communist Party of the United States and later continued 
as part of a broader campaign led by J. Edgar Hoover to 
discredit King.174   
The COINTELPRO program was extensive175 and 
sought to make certain civil rights organizations ineffective 
through “disruption” tactics, which included FBI agents 
infiltrating domestic organizations, creating misinformation 
schemes within those organizations, and disturbing their 
activities.176  The FBI even worked with local law enforcement 
to disrupt organizations and to target individuals that they 
saw as potentially influential.177  In one tragic instance, Fred 
Hampton, a young Black leader from Chicago, was killed by 
local police in Chicago as the result of a COINTELPRO plot that 
involved local law enforcement.178  The civil rights movement 
challenged a racially discriminatory status quo in America—
this meant that for J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI, protecting the 
national security of the United States was synonymous with 
maintenance of a legal-political system that protected white 
supremacy.  This again demonstrates that national security 
                                               
171 Id. 
172 Beverly Gage, What an Uncensored Letter to M.L.K. Reveals, 





175 S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 22 (1976). 
176 Saito, supra note 167, at 1080. 
177 S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 20–23. 
178 Ted Gregory, The Black Panther Raid and the Death of Fred 
Hampton, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 19, 2007), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ 
nationworld/politics/chi-chicagodays-pantherraid-story-story.html [https:// 
perma.cc/EGC9-9VVG].  Even if one were to argue that the FBI was only 
surveilling groups that espoused violence, the FBI’s record of infiltration of 
civil rights organizations and leaders drew no such distinctions and 
included groups and leaders that advocated nonviolent protest, such as 
Martin Luther King, Jr.  See S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 172–83. 
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officials viewed the African American community through the 
race as threat lens. 
In 1975, the Senate created the Select Committee to 
Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence 
Activities (also known as the “Church Committee” after its 
chair, Senator Frank Church of Idaho) to investigate “the 
extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities 
were engaged in” by the intelligence agencies, including the 
FBI and CIA’s infiltration of domestic organizations.179  The 
Church Committee found that procedures for executive branch 
review of intelligence agency activities were inadequate and 
had been circumvented, allowing intelligence agencies to engage 
in abuses domestically and abroad.180  It revealed that with 
respect to domestic organizations involved in the civil rights 
and anti-Vietnam War protests: 
 
FBI headquarters alone ha[d] developed over 
500,000 domestic intelligence files, and these 
have been augmented by additional files at FBI 
Field Offices.  The FBI opened 65,000 of these 
domestic intelligence files in 1972 alone.  In 
fact, substantially more individuals and groups 
are subject to intelligence scrutiny than the 
number of files would appear to indicate, since 
typically, each domestic intelligence file contains 
information on more than one individual or 
group . . . .181 
 
The report found that “certain domestic intelligence activities 
were clearly wrong . . . . [W]e would ban tactics such as those 
used in the FBI’s COINTELPRO.”182  As a result of its findings, 
the Church Committee made several recommendations to 
prevent intelligence agency abuse of Americans’ constitutional 
rights.183  It suggested legislation that would require all covert 
actions by intelligence and investigative agencies to be approved 
                                               
179 S. Res. 21, 94th Cong. (1975). 
180 S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 159.  The House created a similar 
commission—the House Select Committee on Intelligence (also known as 
the Pike Committee)—that came to similar conclusions.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-
833 (1976). 
181 S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 6–7 (footnotes omitted). 
182 Id. at 292–93. 
183 Id. at 296–341. 
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by a committee consisting of the Secretaries of State and 
Defense, the National Security Adviser, the CIA Director, the 
Attorney General, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff.184  The Committee also drafted legislation intended to 
prevent abuses in the domestic collection of intelligence that 
“threaten the very values that form the foundation of our 
society.”185  The report pointedly called for: 
 
prohibiting Bureau interference in lawful speech, 
publication, assembly, organization, or associa-
tion of Americans[.]  [T]he Committee intends 
to prohibit a Bureau agent from mailing fake 
letters to factionalize a group as well as to 
prohibit an informant from manipulating or 
influencing the peaceful activities of a group on 
behalf of the FBI.   
Subsequent recommendations limit the 
kinds of investigations which can be opened and 
provide controls for those investigations.  Specifi-
cally, the Committee limits FBI authority to 
collect information on Americans to enumerated 
circumstances; limits authority to maintain 
information on political beliefs, political associa-
tions, or private lives of Americans; requires 
judicial warrants for the most intrusive covert 
collection techniques (electronic surveillance, 
mail opening, and surreptitious entry); and 
proposes new restrictions upon the use of other 
covert techniques, particularly informants.186 
 
To preempt the passage of legislation, President Ford 
passed Executive Order 11,905, which encompassed the rec-
ommendations made in the Church Committee Report, includ-
ing the formation of an Operations Advisory Group similar to 
the covert activity oversight committee called for by the 
Committee.187  The Executive Order also restricted agencies, 
other than the FBI, from engaging in domestic surveillance and 
restricted the FBI’s domestic activities relative to American 
persons in the manner called for by the Church Committee.188  
                                               
184 Id. at 159–61. 
185 Id. at vii. 
186 Id. at 317. 
187 Exec. Order No. 11,905, 41 Fed. Reg. 7703 (Feb. 18, 1976). 
188 Id. 
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It further prohibited intelligence agencies from engaging in hu-
man experimentation or assassinations (both abuses committed 
by the CIA).189 The intelligence oversight framework adopted by 
President Ford essentially remains intact—President Carter 
added congressional oversight responsibilities in Executive 
Order 12,036, and President Reagan provided additional 
structure to intelligence collection and oversight in Executive 
Order 12,333, an amended version of which remains in effect 
today.190  Due to litigation challenging the FBI’s use of wire-
tapping during COINTELPRO investigations, the United 
States Supreme Court ruled that federal investigative agency 
wiretapping was subject to the Fourth Amendment and required 
prior judicial approval.191   
In 1976, several Washington, D.C. area residents who 
had been involved in civil rights and anti-Vietnam War organ-
izations and were targeted by COINTELPRO sued FBI and 
D.C. officials for violations of their constitutional rights related 
to the COINTELPRO program.192  The plaintiffs won most of 
their claims.193  In its appellate opinion, the D.C. Circuit Court 
of Appeals noted that “[g]overnment action, taken with the 
intent to disrupt or destroy lawful organizations, or to deter 
membership in those groups, is absolutely unconstitutional.”194 
With new limitations placed on their conduct by the 
courts, an executive order, and greater congressional oversight, 
national security institutions had the opportunity to shift away 
                                               
189 Id. 
190 See Exec. Order No. 12,036, 43 Fed. Reg. 3674 (Jan. 24, 1978); 
Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 8, 1981).  For executive 
orders amending Executive Order 12,333, see also Exec. Order No. 13,284, 
68 Fed. Reg. 4075 (Jan. 23, 2003); Exec. Order No. 13,355, 69 Fed Reg. 
53,593 (Aug. 27, 2004); and Exec. Order No. 13,470, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,325 
(July 30, 2008). 
191 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 321 
(1972).  Congress also took action in 1978 when it passed the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which created a FISA court to legally 
authorize foreign intelligence surveillance and provided standards for the 
approval of such surveillance within the United States.  Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885c (2012)).    
192 Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 10–11, 13 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 29. 
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from a minority race as threat approach.195  After an existential 
threat to the nation occurred on September 11, 2001, however, 
the national security response reverted to a minority race as 
threat framework directed at those perceived to be Muslim. 
 
B. Race as Threat Profiling After 9/11 
The same vulnerability experienced by Americans fol-
lowing the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1942 revisited 
the nation following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  
The country was fearful and knew little about the enemy that 
had attacked it.  Although President George W. Bush publicly 
stated that Islam was a religion of peace and that the country 
was not at war with Islam,196 national and local authorities 
treated members of Muslim communities in the United States 
with suspicion.197  Legal scholars such as Khaled Beydoun, 
Sahar Aziz, and Amna Akbar have detailed how Islamophobia 
manifested itself in national security policies following 9/11 that 
disproportionately targeted Muslim American communities.198   
                                               
195 Though it is impossible to argue that institutional discrimination 
by the FBI ended with COINTELPRO, the Church Committee findings and 
recommendations did provide for greater oversight and critique of agency 
excesses and constitutional violations. 
196Anthony Zurcher, What Trump Team Has Said About Islam, 
BBC (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38886496 
[https://perma.cc/5ZVJ-766T]. 
197 See Volpp, supra note 8, at 1578 (“[W]e know that the vast 
majority of those detained appear to be Middle Eastern, Muslim, or South 
Asian.  We know, too, that the majority were identified to the government 
through suspicions and tips based solely upon perceptions of their racial, 
religious, or ethnic identity.” (footnote omitted)); see also Muneer I. Ahmad, 
A Rage Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of 
Passion, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1278 (2004) (discussing the “logic” of post-
September 11 governmental profiling, which concluded that all Arabs and 
all Muslims are likely to be terrorists). 
198 See KHALED A. BEYDOUN, AMERICAN ISLAMOPHOBIA: 
UNDERSTANDING THE ROOTS AND RISE OF FEAR (2018) [hereinafter BEYDOUN, 
AMERICAN ISLAMOPHOBIA]; Amna Akbar, National Security's Broken 
Windows, 62 UCLA L. REV. 834 (2015) [hereinafter Akbar, National 
Security’s Broken Windows]; Amna Akbar, Policing “Radicalization,” 3 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 809 (2013) [hereinafter Akbar, Policing “Radicalization”]; 
Sahar F. Aziz, Losing the “War of Ideas:” A Critique of Countering Violent 
Extremism Programs, 52 TEX. INT’L L.J. 255 (2017) [hereinafter Aziz, Losing 
the War of Ideas]; Sahar F. Aziz, Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective 
Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 429 (2011) 
[hereinafter Aziz, Caught in a Preventive Dragnet]; Khaled A. Beydoun, 
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Akbar argues that the FBI’s post-9/11 Muslim American 
community engagement programs were essentially counter-
radicalization or countering violent extremism (CVE) initiatives 
based on the presumption that particular political and religious 
views of the Muslim American community corresponded with 
a propensity for terrorist activity, despite a lack of sound meth-
odological support for that conclusion.199  Akbar notes that the 
widespread use of CVE programs in Muslim American commu-
nities is not justified, because research indicates that there is 
no single profile of a terrorist, no markers for how someone 
becomes a terrorist, and no data to show that the Muslim 
community in general is becoming more radicalized or more 
violent.200  These “community engagement” programs become 
surveillance initiatives in which views shared by Muslim 
American participants in “engagement” meetings unwittingly 
become part of national security files maintained about Muslim 
American community members.201  Other community members 
are utilized as informants, reporting on the political and reli-
gious views of others within Muslim American mosques and 
organizations—techniques reminiscent of COINTELPRO.202   
Furthermore, the FBI programs place a penalty on group 
members’ religious expression and belief.  Beydoun notes that 
the impact of these CVE practices falls most directly on the most 
religiously observant, as CVE programs link propensity for 
radicalization with religious piety.203  In addition, the monitoring 
of Muslim Americans’ religious observance, political views, 
speech, and associations through informants and review of 
online expression negatively impacts their First Amendment 
and Fourth Amendment rights.204  Sahar Aziz observes that 
the American government’s primary focus on counterterrorism 
                                               
Acting Muslim, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2018) [hereinafter Beydoun, 
Acting Muslim]; Khaled A. Beydoun, Between Indigence, Islamophobia, and 
Erasure: Poor and Muslim in “War on Terror” America, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 
1463 (2016) [hereinafter Beydoun, Between Indigence, Islamophobia, and 
Erasure]. 
199 Akbar, National Security’s Broken Windows, supra note 198, at 
848–50. 
200 Id. at 878–79. 
201 Id. at 852–54. 
202 Id. 
203 Beydoun, Between Indigence, Islamophobia, and Erasure, supra 
note 198, at 1487–90. 
204 Id. at 1488. 
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initiatives targeting the Muslim American community has had 
the effect of creating a racialized subtext of Muslims as terror 
suspects that has manifested itself in the “suspicion[] of mosques 
as bastions of extremists, Muslim charities as supporters of 
terrorism, and imams as unpatriotic for refusing to spy on 
their congregations.”205 
The Supreme Court case, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, details the 
Bush Administration’s use of national security justifications 
for the targeting of Muslim communities immediately following 
9/11.206  Two months after 9/11, Javaid Iqbal, a Muslim Pakistani 
national who was an undocumented immigrant in the United 
States, was questioned and then detained by FBI and 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officials on 
suspicion that he had been involved in the 9/11 bombings in 
New York.207  Iqbal was arrested and detained in the adminis-
trative special housing unit of the Metropolitan Detention 
Center, a special unit for post-9/11 detainees.208  This unit 
housed approximately eighty-four detainees arrested in relation 
to 9/11 investigations.209  According to Iqbal, he was repeatedly 
beaten during his detention, was subjected to frequent strip 
and body cavity searches, and was confined in a cell with 
bright lights all night causing sleep deprivation, depression, 
and anxiety.210  After an investigation, the Department of 
Justice Inspector General concluded that these abuses had 
occurred and disciplined several officers, though none were 
charged with crimes.211   
Iqbal sued then attorney general Ashcroft and then FBI 
director Mueller for violating his First and Fifth Amendment 
rights through the creation and execution of a program that 
targeted thousands of Muslim men for arrest and detention 
under harsh conditions because of their race, religion, and 
national origin.212  Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy 
reasoned that Iqbal’s complaint did not plead sufficient facts 
                                               
205 Aziz, Caught in a Preventive Dragnet, supra note 198, at 477.  
206 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667–69 (2009). 
207 Id. 
208 Id. 
209 Shirin Sinnar, The Lost Story of Iqbal, 105 GEO. L.J. 379, 399 
(2017). 
210 Id. at 401–02. 
211 Id. at 402. 
212 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 669. 
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to indicate purposeful or unlawful discrimination on the part 
of the federal government.213  In the majority’s view, 
 
a legitimate policy directing law enforcement to 
arrest and detain individuals because of their 
suspected link to the attacks would produce a 
disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, 
even though the purpose of the policy was to 
target neither Arabs nor Muslims.  On the facts 
respondent alleges the arrests Mueller oversaw 
were likely lawful and justified by his nondis-
criminatory intent to detain aliens who were 
illegally present in the United States and who 
had potential connections to those who committed 
terrorist acts.  As between that “obvious alterna-
tive explanation” for the arrests and the pur-
poseful, invidious discrimination respondent asks 
us to infer, discrimination is not a plausible 
conclusion.214 
 
The Court dismissed the charges on procedural grounds, finding 
that Iqbal had failed to meet the Court’s recently-adopted 
heightened pleading standard.215   
Although the Court found that Iqbal had not plead 
sufficient facts to support his legal claim of discrimination, an 
analysis of the Iqbal case and post-9/11 arrest patterns by 
Professor Shirin Sinnar reveals that arrest patterns during 
that period reflected discriminatory targeting on the basis of 
race, color, national origin, or religion.216  As Sinnar observes, 
the Court conflated the “Arab” and “Muslim” identities into 
the racial-religious category of “Arab Muslim,” which related 
the detainees to the airplane hijackers.217  In the Court’s view, 
arrests among this group were an incidental and justified 
                                               
213 Id. at 682. 
214 Id. (citation omitted). 
215 Id. at 680 (noting that, under Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 570 (2007), complaints must allege sufficient facts that move legal 
claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible”). 
216 Sinnar, supra note 209, at 416–21. 
217 Id. at 416–18; see also Khaled A. Beydoun, Between Muslim and 
White: The Legal Construction of Arab American Identity, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 29, 30 (2013) (discussing the legal roots of this conflation). 
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result of the investigation rather than the result of invidious 
discrimination.218   
However, as Sinnar notes, there are problems with the 
broad descriptor “Arab Muslim”—one is a religion and the 
other is an ethnic and linguistic identity.  The majority of Arab 
Americans in the United States are not Muslim (three-fourths 
are Christian), and Arabs constitute only fifteen to eighteen 
percent of the Muslim population worldwide.219  Among the 
762 immigrants detained in the United States following 9/11, 
254 were from Pakistan, 111 were from Egypt, and the 
remaining top ten nationalities were Turkish, Jordanian, 
Yemeni, Indian, Saudi Arabian, Moroccan, Tunisian, and 
Syrian.220  These statistics were available to the Court in the 
DOJ Inspector General report that it cited.221  The demographic 
statistics reveal that the arrested detainees were not all Arab; 
in fact, the largest country represented, Pakistan, is South 
Asian, and two of the other top ten nationalities detained—
Turkish and Indian—are also not “Arab.”  Nor is India a 
majority-Muslim country.222  Instead of race or color being 
incidental to the arrests as posited by the Court, a perception 
that individuals were Muslim, Arab, or Middle Eastern was a 
central factor in post-9/11 arrests by government agencies.223   
Muneer Ahmad describes this post-9/11 terrorist 
suspect category as encompassing “not only Arab Muslims, but 
Arab Christians, Muslim non-Arabs (such as Pakistanis or 
Indonesians), non-Muslim South Asians (Sikhs, Hindus), and 
even Latin[x] and African Americans, depending on how 
closely they approach[ed] the phenotypic stereotype of the 
terrorist.”224  For this reason, many Pakistanis such as Iqbal, 
who did not share the same nationality nor an Arab linguistic 
or cultural identity with the 9/11 hijackers, became targets of 
the post-9/11 investigation.225  It was their appearance and 
relative visibility, rather than a factual linkage to terrorists, 
that made them suspects.  As Sinnar accurately observes, 
                                               
218 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680–81. 
219 Sinnar, supra note 209, at 417–18. 
220 Id. at 417. 
221 Id. at 415–16. 
222 Id. at 417. 
223 Volpp, supra note 8, at 1576–78, 1584, 1590. 
224 Ahmad, supra note 197, at 1278–79. 
225 Id. 
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even if the Court had meant that those arrested were either 
Arab or Muslim—rather than both—such a view would 
undermine the Court’s basic contention that any disparate 
impact in the racial and religious composition of those 
arrested was due to their “potential connection” (in Justice 
Kennedy’s words) to the terrorist hijackers.226  Under that 
rationale, the more attenuated the potential connections—
which in Iqbal’s case meant no Arabic or nationality-based 
connections to the terrorist hijackers—the less likely that race 
or religion were merely incidental to the arrests.   
Subsequent review of post-9/11 arrests reveals that 
race and religious-based assumptions were central, instead of 
incidental, to many of the arrests.  Although some of those 
initially arrested did have a link to the hijackers (such as 
being roommates and attending flight school together), many 
more were arrested because they appeared to be Muslim and 
had an immigration or criminal record.227  The DOJ Inspector 
General report reveals that many agents followed up on calls 
from the general public expressing suspicion solely on the 
basis of someone’s identity and generally acceptable conduct, 
including several Middle Eastern men arrested after law 
enforcement found pictures of famous buildings like the World 
Trade Center in their car during traffic stops and an 
immigrant arrested after someone reported that more Middle 
Eastern men than necessary were running a grocery store.228  
A Human Rights Watch report further reveals that two 
Somali men were deemed suspicious because they kneeled to 
pray in a parking lot, an Egyptian man was detained by a 
Newark officer for asking for directions, and an Iranian citizen 
was apparently asked for his immigration documentation 
during a traffic stop because an officer noticed his “Muslim-
sounding” name.229  An author who spoke with forty ex-detainees 
observed that “[o]ne story after another reveal[ed] that racial 
profiling triggered suspicion against individuals and that spe-
                                               
226 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 682 (2009); Sinnar, supra note 
209, at 390, 419. 
227 Sinnar, supra note 209, at 420. 
228 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE 
SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON 
IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE 
SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 16–17 (2003). 
229 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PRESUMPTION OF GUILT: HUMAN 
RIGHTS ABUSES OF POST-SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES 12–15 (2002). 
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cific questions about their religion led to their arrests.”230  The 
post-9/11 treatment of Americans perceived to be Muslim or 
Arab was another permutation of the historic treatment of mi-
nority race as threat.  Racial grievance and division caused by 
such practices, and the attitudes undergirding them, facilitated 
the insertion of Russia’s racial exploitation campaign. 
 
V. CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORKS DO NOT FULLY 
ADDRESS RUSSIA’S CYBER CAMPAIGN 
Russia’s exploitation of the racial division fostered by 
racially-biased state practices led to a foreign influence cam-
paign that violated American law.  An examination of the legal 
prohibitions against such foreign interference is instructive to 
understanding both the options and challenges involved in an 
American response.  This Part discusses the domestic and inter-
national legal prohibitions against foreign election intervention 
on social media.   
 
A. United States Legal Prohibitions Against Foreign 
Election Interference  
Although the Constitution’s drafters expressed signifi-
cant concern about foreign influence in domestic elections, no 
explicit prohibition addressing such foreign influence appears 
in the Constitution.231  In 1972, Congress expressly prohibited 
political campaign contributions from all foreign sources due to 
the revelation that the Nixon campaign had fundraised directly 
from foreign sources.232  Federal law now prohibits any political 
contributions from foreign sources for federal, state, or local 
elections and also makes it a felony for a person in the United 
States to solicit or accept such contributions, punishable by five 
years in prison for violations aggregating over $25,000.233   
                                               
230 See IRUM SHIEKH, DETAINED WITHOUT CAUSE: MUSLIMS’ STORIES 
OF DETENTION AND DEPORTATION IN AMERICA AFTER 9/11, at 19–21 (2011). 
231 See Zephyr Teachout, Extraterritorial Electioneering and the 
Globalization of American Elections, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 162, 168–69 
(2009) (“The Constitutions’ founders were intensely concerned about the 
prospect of foreign involvement in American politics.”). 
232 Margaret K. Lewis, When Foreign Is Criminal, 55 VA. J. INT’L L. 
625, 663 (2015). 
233 Id.; see also 2 U.S.C. §§ 441e, 437g(d)(1)(A)(i) (2012). 
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Although the Supreme Court’s 2010 Citizens United de-
cision invalidated a federal restriction on campaign expenditures 
by domestic corporations as a violation of the First Amendment, 
the Court made clear in its opinion that the legal ban on foreign 
campaign expenditures remained intact.234  If challenged, legal 
scholars tend to agree that the Court would maintain the ban 
against foreign expenditures in American political campaigns 
in order to protect the integrity of the electoral process.235  
Further, while the Constitution does not specifically prohibit 
foreign influence over elections, the Emoluments Clause ex-
pressly prohibits foreign influence over American government 
officials.236  The Court could find that the constitutional pro-
hibition on foreign influence over elected officials bolsters the 
constitutionality of the legislative prohibition on foreign 
influence over the same officials’ campaigns. 
Special Counsel Mueller’s February 2018 indictment 
charges Russian institutions and nationals with violating the 
federal law prohibiting foreign financing of elections.237  The 
indictment charges the Russian entities and agents with 
violating the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) prohibi-
tions on foreign entities making contributions, expenditures, or 
disbursements for electioneering purposes.238  The indictment 
also charges them with violating the Foreign Agent Registration 
Act’s requirement that any agent of a foreign government 
                                               
234 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010) (noting that 
the Court was not addressing § 441e of the law, which specifically referenced 
political contribution and expenditure bans related to “foreign nationals,” 
but was rather addressing 2 U.S.C. § 441b, which covered all corporate 
expenditures); see also id. at 422–23 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Although we 
have not reviewed them directly, [the Supreme Court] ha[s] never cast doubt 
on laws that place special restrictions on campaign spending by foreign 
nationals.”). 
235 See, e.g., Tim Bakken, Constitutional Rights and Political Power 
of Corporations After Citizens United: The Decline of Citizens and the Rise 
of Foreign Corporations and Super PACs, 12 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & 
ETHICS J. 119, 141–46 (2013) (examining whether foreign corporations have 
First Amendment rights); Toni M. Massaro, Foreign Nationals, Electoral 
Spending, and the First Amendment, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 663, 703 
(2011) (“The Court nevertheless is likely to uphold the restrictions to 
prevent undue foreign influence over elections.”). 
236 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (prohibiting members of the federal 
government from receiving “any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any 
kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State”). 
237 Indictment, supra note 12. 
238 Id. ¶ 25. 
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operating in the United States and attempting to influence 
public opinion, policy, or law must register with the Department 
of Justice and disclose the scope of the activities.239  Finally, the 
indictment charges that the Russian defendants defrauded the 
United States and committed bank and wire fraud in 
furtherance of their conspiracy to impair, obstruct, and defeat 
the lawful government functions of the United States by 
dishonest means and to interfere with American political and 
electoral processes.240 
Though the indictment illuminated the scope of Russian 
intervention in the elections, bringing the Russian entities and 
nationals to justice will be difficult.  The Russian government 
is unlikely to cooperate in transferring the individuals to the 
United States to face justice and will likely claim sovereign 
immunity for any actions of Russian government agencies, if it 
responds at all. 
 
B. International Law Prohibitions Against Foreign 
Intervention  
International law also addresses foreign intervention in 
domestic electoral processes.  International law arising both 
from treaties and from customary state practice is instructive.  
The  Supreme Court has determined that in order for treaty-
based rights to be enforceable as private rights of action in 
American courts, the treaties must be self-executing241 or the 
treaty rights must be codified in domestic legislation.242  There 
are several treaties to which the United States is a party that 
touch on the question of foreign interference in domestic 
                                               
239 Id. ¶ 26. 
240 Id. ¶¶ 2–10, 28, 97. 
241 A self-executing treaty creates private enforcement rights when 
its terms are so clear as to not require independent action by Congress or 
the Executive to enforce said rights.  For factors relevant to determining 
that a treaty is self-executing, see Michael A. McKenzie, Treaty Enforcement 
in U.S. Courts—United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791 (S.D. Fla. 1992), 
34 HARV. INT’L L.J. 596, 603 (1993). 
242 See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (determining that 
although Mexican nationals convicted of crimes in Texas courts were denied 
consular visits as required by the terms of the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations (VCCR), the terms of the treaty were not enforceable as 
domestic law in the United States because the VCCR was not “self-
executing” and Congress had not passed separate legislation to give it 
effect). 
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elections.  First, the United Nations (U.N.) Charter, a multilat-
eral treaty that entered into force in 1945, prohibits U.N. 
member states from the “threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state”243 but 
permits responsive action in self-defense.244  The Russian social 
media campaign, while intrusive, does not necessarily rise to the 
level of a threat or use of force, as no physical armed attack was 
used or threatened against the United States.  Although 
cyberattacks that cause significant physical damage can consti-
tute armed attacks under international law, Russian interfer-
ence in this instance did not involve direct physical violence or 
harm to individuals.245  
Foreign espionage has not been expressly addressed 
under international law.  Scholars have argued that espionage 
has historically been a violation of domestic, but not interna-
tional, law.246  Intelligence collection involves the compilation 
of sensitive information regarding foreign government policies 
and positions through espionage, signal intelligence from 
infiltrated radio and phone traffic, satellite intelligence, 
media, and other methods.247  The information is then used to 
inform the collecting government’s decision-making.248   
In addition to intelligence collection, intelligence activity 
can also include covert operations—secret operations that 
intelligence organizations undertake in foreign states.249  The 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has determined that 
                                               
243 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. (prohibiting United Nations member 
states from “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence” of other member states). 
244 U.N. Charter art. 51 (allowing United Nations member states to 
act in self-defense when an armed attack has occurred). 
245 As discussed later in this subsection, the United States 
Department of Defense Law of War Manual treats cyberattacks that cause 
physical damage or violence as “armed attacks” under international law, 
warranting a proportionate response.  See also infra note 258 and accompa-
nying text.  The Russian cyber campaign did not involve direct violence by 
the IRA, although it did encourage radical groups to host rallies that became 
violent.  
246 See, e.g., Jens David Ohlin, Did Russian Cyber Interference in 
the 2016 Election Violate International Law?, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1579, 1580 
(2017).  
247 Geoffrey B. Demarest, Espionage in International Law, 24 
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 321, 324 (1996). 
248 Id. at 322. 
249 Id. at 330. 
240 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW [Vol. 9:2 
 
covert action, such as proxy wars, involving armed activity 
and intervention in another state is violative of international 
law if not carried out in accordance with U.N. Charter 
procedures.250  As an example, in Nicaragua v. United States, 
the ICJ determined that the United States had impermissibly 
intervened in the Nicaraguan civil war in violation of 
customary international law.251  It said the United States did 
so by providing weapons and various forms of military support 
to an armed insurgency through the CIA without having an 
independent self-defense rationale for the intervention (as 
Nicaragua had not militarily attacked the United States).252   
There has been increasing consensus in the academic 
community that cyber warfare and cyberattacks are subject to 
the international law of armed conflict.  For example, in 2007, 
Estonia, a former Soviet state, was the victim of a three-week-
long cyberattack.253  Its institutions’ webpages—including the 
websites of the president, parliament, political parties, banks, 
and news agencies—were subject to denial of service attacks, 
defacement, and destruction.254  Most of the attacks originated 
from IP addresses in Russia and were organized in a manner 
that suggested command and control.255  Immediately before 
the attack, the Russian government expressed opposition to 
the Estonian government’s removal of a Soviet-era World War 
II memorial.256  The attack disrupted communications, under-
mined the economy, and halted a number of Estonian 
government activities.257 
The cyberattack on Estonia led the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2008 to accredit the NATO 
Cooperative Cyber Defense Center in Tallinn, Estonia as a 
Center of Excellence with the mandate to invite an international 
group of experts to produce the Tallinn Manual on the 
                                               
250 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). 
251 Id. ¶ 82. 
252 Id. ¶ 92. 
253 Scott J. Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing 
Cyber Attacks in International Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 192, 203 (2009).  
254 Id. at 203 n.57, 206. 
255 Id. at 203 n.57. 
256 Id.  
257 Id. at 246. 
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international law governing cyber warfare.258  Similarly, the 
Obama Administration adopted a cyberspace strategy in 2011, 
which stated that “[l]ong-standing international norms guiding 
state behavior . . . also apply in cyberspace.”259  That guidance 
is reflected in the Department of Defense Law of War Manual 
(“DOD Law of War Manual”), which states that if a 
cyberattack creates the “kind of physical damage that would 
be caused by dropping a bomb or firing a missile, that 
cyberattack would equally be subject to the same rules that 
apply to attacks using bombs or missiles.”260  Cyberattacks 
may constitute “uses of force within the meaning of . . . the 
Charter of the United Nations,” giving “rise to a right to take 
necessary and proportionate action in self-defense.”261  
It remains an open question whether Russian cyber 
interference in American elections constitutes the same 
destabilizing infrastructural attack that would violate the 
laws of armed conflict.  Russian interference did not involve 
armed attacks or the destruction of infrastructure, even as it 
sought to disrupt the American political process through 
social media and disinformation campaigns.  The DOD Law of 
War Manual leaves open the possibility that cyber intelligence 
activities would not be treated as a use of force “to the extent 
that cyber operations resemble traditional intelligence and 
counter-intelligence activities, such as unauthorized intrusions 
into computer networks solely to acquire information . . . .”262  
As Russian election interference goes beyond information 
collection but does not rise to the level of a physical attack, it 
pushes the boundaries of international law.263   
                                               
258 See TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO 
CYBER WARFARE 6 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013). 
259 WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE:  
PROSPERITY, SECURITY, AND OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED WORLD 9 (2011). 
260 OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL 997 (2015) [hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR 
MANUAL].  
261 Id. at 998, 1000. 
262 Id. at 999. 
263 See Ashley Deeks, An International Legal Framework for 
Surveillance, 55 VA. J. INT’L L. 291 (2015) (arguing for the development of 
international law to govern cyber surveillance); Craig Forcese, Spies 
Without Borders: International Law and Intelligence Collection, 5 J. NAT’L 
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 179 (2011) (arguing that cyber espionage has been 
conducted largely by countries free from legal controls). 
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Because Russian online interference raises questions 
regarding the nationality of the user, the extent of First 
Amendment protection is unclear.  Further, indictments against 
foreign agents in Russia are unlikely to lead to prosecutions 
absent Russian cooperation.264  Given the challenges that 
Russian cyber interference presents to historic legal frameworks 
and their enforcement, new approaches must be pursued to 
confront this threat.  A reframing of the manner in which our 
national security institutions address questions of race is a 
first and crucial step toward alleviating the racial division 
that the Russian state has so effectively exploited.  The next 
Section presents a recommendation for how national security 
institutions might begin to reframe their treatment of race in 
the United States to confront Russian interference. 
 
C. International Law Prohibitions Against the 
Incitement of Racial Hatred 
International human rights law prohibits the advocacy 
of racial hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, 
hostility, or violence.  Specifically, Article 20 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), a multilateral 
human rights treaty to which the United States is a party, states 
that “[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that 
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence 
shall be prohibited by law.”265  Russia’s cyber disinformation 
campaign incites racial hostility, and even violence, in cases 
where it has promoted gatherings and sought to inflame 
                                               
264 See Jennie Neufeld, Read the Full Transcript of the Helsinki 
Press Conference, VOX (July 17, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/7/16/ 
17576956/transcript-putin-trump-russia-helsinki-press-conference [https:// 
perma.cc/X5W5-4MV4].  Despite President Putin’s offer at the Helsinki 
summit to cooperate with the Mueller investigation, none of the Russians 
indicted have been transferred to the United States.  Putin’s offer was likely 
rhetorical, as he conditioned it on the transfer of American political appointees 
to Russia for “political” prosecutions.  Id. 
265 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 20, 
adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) 
[hereinafter ICCPR].  The European Union has required all of its twenty-
seven members to criminalize the incitement of racial violence.  See Europe 
Outlaws Race Hate Incitement, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Oct. 1, 2007), 
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2007/europe-
outlaws-race-hate-incitement [https://perma.cc/7MJS-NM3V]. 
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participants through extremist rhetoric.266  However, the 
United States has not expressly prohibited through legislation 
the advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that 
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence.  
In ratifying the ICCPR, the United States adopted a 
reservation that states that Article 20 does not “restrict the 
right of free speech and association protected by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States.”267  While First 
Amendment concerns prevent the United States from passing 
a federal law criminalizing or prohibiting the advocacy of 
hatred that incites hostility, discrimination, or violence, the 
Supreme Court has determined that words inciting violence 
(or “fighting words”) are beyond First Amendment protection.268  
Though the ICCPR’s prohibition against the advocacy 
and incitement of racial hostility and violence has not been 
implemented through a federal law that would punish or 
prevent the IRA’s socially divisive posts, social media 
companies have instituted user policies that prohibit the 
advocacy and incitement of racial hostility and violence on 
their platforms.269  These user policies align with the language 
of Article 20 of the ICCPR and are a useful tool to limit the 
impact of Russia’s cyber disinformation campaign.  Similarly, 
incorporating prohibitions against the incitement of racial 
hatred and violence by state agents into the United States’ 
formal  national security strategy, as this Article recommends, 
is in keeping with the ICCPR and does not unduly infringe upon 
the First Amendment rights of American citizens.270   
 
                                               
266 See discussion supra Part II. 
267 138 CONG. REC. S4781-01 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992); see also Harold 
Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1497 
(2003). 
268 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); see also 
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).  
269 See Community Standards: Violence and Criminal Behavior, 
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/violence_criminal_ 
behavior [https://perma.cc/5L7S-WESW]; The Twitter Rules, TWITTER, 
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/twitter-rules [https://perma.cc/ 
X2TE-954T]; Community Guidelines, INSTAGRAM, https://help.instagram. 
com/477434105621119 [https://perma.cc/LN37-3BBN]. 
270 United States government agents and institutions can be expected, 
by virtue of their employment, to act in accordance with employment 
arrangements intended to prevent incitement to discrimination, hostility, 
or violence.  Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969).  
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VI. TOWARD A NEW RACISM AS THREAT NATIONAL 
SECURITY PROGRAM 
In its recent attack against American democratic institu-
tions, Russia has exploited the racial tensions and divisions 
that have arisen out of current manifestations of a minority 
race as threat national security state.  A new approach to 
national security, as it relates to race, must replace the race 
as threat paradigm.  This new approach must both address 
ongoing violations of minorities’ rights by national security 
institutions and eliminate Russian and other actors’ ability to 
weaponize racial divisions against Americans through social 
media.  This Article suggests a racism as threat national security 
paradigm as that new approach. 
 
A. The Post-Racial Myth Following the Obama 
Election 
After President Obama’s election, some political and 
social commentators began to proclaim that we had transitioned 
into a post-racial America.271  The election of an African 
American president symbolized America’s movement past its 
history of racial discrimination and division.  While President 
Obama’s election marked a new pinnacle in political achieve-
ment for the African American community and reflected racial 
progress in the United States, his election did not produce, nor 
reflect, the end of racial discrimination in America.  The nega-
tive racial tenor of much of the political opposition to President 
Obama during his eight years in office evidenced this reality.272   
Several events occurred during President Obama’s 
administration that illustrated how endemic the race as threat 
paradigm is within national security institutions.  For example, 
several states began to push legislative proposals targeted at 
undocumented workers that had a discriminatory impact upon 
the Latinx community.273  Arizona passed a law which made it a 
                                               
271 Peniel Joseph, Obama’s Effort to Heal Racial Divisions and 




273 Ian Gordon & Tasneem Raja, 164 Anti-Immigration Laws 
Passed Since 2010? A MoJo Analysis, MOTHER JONES (2012), https://www. 
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state crime to be present in Arizona without immigration 
documents and to seek employment without paperwork, 
provided local police with the authority to determine the federal 
immigration status of someone detained or arrested, and 
authorized warrantless arrests of people believed to be 
removable from the United States based on probable cause.274  
The Supreme Court invalidated all of the provisions of the law 
except for the warrantless arrests based on probable cause, 
because the laws contravened federal supremacy regarding the 
enforcement of immigration laws.275  Other states pushed for 
identification laws that would harm immigrants’ ability to 
conduct many day-to-day affairs, such as driving.276  Law 
enforcement officers, like Sheriff Arpaio in Arizona, engaged in 
discriminatory stops of Latinx citizens and noncitizens in the 
state for the purposes of immigration enforcement.277   
Several state governments also sued to prevent the 
President from implementing Deferred Action for Parents of 
Childhood Arrivals (DAPA), which would have enabled the 
parents of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) 
children to remain in the country, keeping families together.278  
While these events could be characterized as race-neutral efforts 
to enforce the law,279 the punitive response to the President’s 
                                               
motherjones.com/politics/2012/03/anti-immigration-law-database/ [https:// 
perma.cc/65PW-7JMB]. 
274 Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, S. 
1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. §§ 2–3, 5–6 (Ariz. 2010). 
275 See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 416 (2012). 
276 See David L. Ulin, Real ID Will Divide Us All into Documented 
and Undocumented, L.A. TIMES (July 30, 2018), https://www.latimes. 
com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-ulin-real-id-20180730-story.html [https://perma.cc/ 
S96M-LJBW]. 
277 Dan Magos, I Was One of Joe Arpaio’s Victims. He Doesn’t 
Deserve a Pardon, WASH. POST (Aug. 26, 2017), https://www.wash 
ingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/08/26/i-was-one-of-joe-arpa 
ios-victims-he-doesnt-deserve-a-pardon [https://perma.cc/S6VQ-UGSY]. 
278 Adam Liptak & Michael D. Shear, Supreme Court Tie Blocks 
Obama Immigration Plan, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2016), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2016/06/24/us/supreme-court-immigration-obama-dapa.html 
[https://perma.cc/BV8C-KHLH]. 
279 See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, Why Arizona Drew a Line, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 28, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/29/opinion/29kobach.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q6PF-2P74]; Hans A. von Spakovsky, DACA Is 
Unconstitutional, as Obama Admitted, HERITAGE FOUND. (Sep. 8, 2017), 
https://www.heritage.org/immigration/commentary/daca-unconstitutional-
obama-admitted [https://perma.cc/86PG-6KNB]. 
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efforts to provide a pathway to citizenship to some undocu-
mented workers indicated broader policy concerns about the 
workers themselves.  Some have argued that this response re-
flects concern about demographic changes and the impending 
“browning” of America.280 
During this period, videos of unarmed African Americans 
being killed by local law enforcement officers went viral on social 
media, raising public consciousness of this discriminatory 
pattern and spurring the creation of the BLM movement.281  
Although police violence and killings of unarmed Black men and 
women were a longstanding issue, the ability of citizens to record 
and share videos of the violence on a mass scale created an 
unprecedented response.282  Despite the impact of the videos, 
holding public officials accountable was difficult, as shown by the 
recurring failure to prosecute or convict those involved with 
these deaths.283  Minority race as threat became a justification 
for state-sanctioned killing, as officers like Darren Wilson, 
Michael Brown’s killer, invoked their fear of Black bodies to 
justify their actions.284 
 
                                               
280 Brian Resnick, White Fear of Demographic Change Is a Powerful 
Psychological Force, VOX (Jan. 28, 2017), https://www.vox.com/science-and-
health/2017/1/26/14340542/white-fear-trump-psychology-minority-majority 
[https://perma.cc/JQ7W-LXAU]. 
281 See Herstory, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter. 
com/about/herstory/ [https://perma.cc/J77B-5MJN]. 
282 Peter Dreier, Racism on Camera, AM. PROSPECT (July 30, 2015), 
https://prospect.org/article/racism-camera [https://perma.cc/YQ2M-GTBK]. 
283 Courtney Teague & Amy B. Wang, Sacramento Police Officers 
Who Fatally Shot Stephon Clark Will Not Be Charged, Prosecutor Says, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2019), https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.washington 
post.com/amphtml/nation/2019/03/02/sacramento-police-officers-who-fatally-
shot-stephon-clark-will-not-be-charged-prosecutor-says [https://perma.cc/M5 
DX-6KDA] (“Just under 1,000 people are shot and killed by police officers 
each year, according to The Washington Post’s database.  A handful of those 
shootings lead to criminal charges, and convictions are even more rare, 
which has prompted intense criticism from civil rights activists across the 
country.”). 
284 Josh Sanburn, All the Ways Darren Wilson Described Being 
Afraid of Michael Brown, TIME (Nov. 25, 2014), http://time.com/3605346/ 
darren-wilson-michael-brown-demon [https://perma.cc/G3UG-3L3V] (referenc-
ing racialized tropes of Black males in describing Brown as a “hulk” and 
“demon”). 
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B. Racial Division During the Trump Administration 
The tenor of President Trump’s campaign and policies 
pursued by his administration have further institutionalized 
racially divisive policies in national security institutions.  As 
he promised during his campaign, President Trump signed 
what came to be known as the “Muslim Ban” executive orders 
targeting immigrants and refugees from Muslim-majority 
countries.285  The Administration has targeted undocumented 
Latinx immigrants in widespread and invasive immigration 
crackdowns,286 systematically removed children from parents 
crossing the border,287 and made efforts to remove DACA 
protections granted by the last administration.288  Further, 
the Administration has signaled to law enforcement that 
efforts at reform to address unarmed killings of African 
Americans are no longer a priority.289  In addition, through the 
posting of many tweets during his campaign and during his 
administration, President Trump has sought to inject racially-
divisive issues into the national dialogue (from targeting NFL 
players for their protest of police violence, to characterizing 
immigrants from Mexico as rapists and murderers, to labeling 
Middle Eastern refugees as terrorists).290  The racially divisive 
                                               
285 See Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017); 
Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017); Proclamation 
No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017); Paul Thornton, The Cruelty 
and Bigotry of Trump’s Immigration Policies, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2018), 
https://www.latimes.com/la-ol-opinion-newsletter-trump-immigration-
20180811-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/C8NV-FA2Z]. 
286 Thornton, supra note 285; see also Ben Leonard, Under Trump 
Arrests of Undocumented Immigrants with No Criminal Record Have 
Tripled, NBC (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigra 
tion/under-trump-arrests-undocumented-immigrants-no-criminal-record-
have-tripled-n899406 [https://perma.cc/5V8V-94GZ]. 
287 Thornton, supra note 285. 
288 Id. 
289 See Margaret Hartmann, Sessions Moves to Roll Back Obama-
Era Police Reforms, N.Y. MAG. (Apr. 4, 2017), http://nymag.com/intelligencer 
/2017/04/sessions-moves-to-roll-back-obama-era-police-reforms.html [https:// 
perma.cc/T4E4-UYLX]. 
290 Christal Hayes, Here Are 10 Times President Trump’s Comments 
Have Been Called Racist, USA TODAY (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www. 
usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2018/08/14/times-president-
trump-comments-called-racist/985438002 [https://perma.cc/969P-7FTX]; see 
Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/realDon 
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policies and rhetoric from the White House may incur support 
from President Trump’s political base, but they also create an 
environment of racial division that Russia is able to exploit 
against the interests of the United States. 
 
C. Toward a Racism as Threat National Security 
Framework 
The majority of American citizens view President 
Trump’s comments while in office as racially divisive.291  Political 
commentators have surmised that he views such rhetoric as 
politically beneficial to his base.292  Racially divisive political 
posturing is nothing new in American politics.293  As a coun-
                                               
aldTrump?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauth
or [https://perma.cc/T3P5-4T4T]. 
291 Jennifer Rubin, Most Americans Agree: President Trump Is 
Divisive, WASH. POST, (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.google.com/amp/s/www. 
washingtonpost.com/amphtml/blogs/right-turn/wp/2018/01/17/most-americans 
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a January 2018 Quinnipiac poll).  The Quinnipiac poll found that sixty-four 
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as much as he respects white people,” and fifty-eight percent believed that 
the comments he made about immigrants from certain countries are racist.  
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UNIV. (Jan. 17, 2018), https://poll.qu.edu/national/release-detail?ReleaseID= 
2513 [https://perma.cc/A27H-UEN6]. 
292 Ashley Parker et al., “I’m Not Going There”: As Trump Hurls 
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Chuck Todd et al., Where Some See Tragedy in Toxic Politics, Trump Sees 
Opportunity, NBC (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/first-
read/where-some-see-tragedy-toxic-politics-trump-sees-opportunity-n925561 
[https://perma.cc/KYS9-CMSU]. 
293 From the debates about slavery during the drafting of the 
Constitution, to Reconstruction-era political battles, to Nixon’s Southern 
Strategy, racial messaging (often divisive) has held a prominent place in 
American politics.  See, e.g., Kevin O’Leary, Trump and the Racial Politics 
of the South, AM. PROSPECT (June 27, 2016), https://prospect.org/article/ 
trump-and-racial-politics-south [https://perma.cc/K7A4-4WVD]; Clay Risen, 
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terweight against politicians that might exploit race for political 
gain and foreign governments’ use of American racial division 
for their own geopolitical ends, the public understanding of 
racial discrimination must be expanded to make clear that 
racism is not only morally wrong, but also is a national 
security vulnerability.294  Enshrining this understanding in 
the public consciousness and in national security strategic 
planning can serve as a bulwark against racial division sown 
by politicians who find political advantage in racial demagogu-
ery and foreign states that exploit that division.  Therefore, this 
Article proposes that social justice and national security legal 
and policy scholars and advocates use the Russian election 
interference campaign to articulate how racism is a national 
security threat and vulnerability that has been weaponized 
against the United States.  In identifying racism as a national 
security threat to the United States, our national security 
institutions can then strategically plan ways to minimize that 
threat, as discussed in Part VII.    
 
D. Legal Underpinnings of a Racism as Threat 
National Security Framework 
Institutionalizing a racism as national security threat 
framework in national security planning is consistent with 
domestic and international law.  The post-Civil War constitu-
tional amendments and legislation of the Civil Rights Era 
addressed, respectively, the legacies of slavery and Jim Crow 
segregation and sought to bring African Americans and other 
racial minorities closer to the promise of equality.295  These 
constitutional provisions, legislation, and related anti-
                                               
How the Party of Lincoln Became the Party of Racial Backlash, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/31/opinion/sunday/spiro-
agnew-mlk.html [https://perma.cc/29B6-Q92X]. 
294 See, e.g., Jason Sattler, Trump and Russia Used Race to Divide 




295 U.S. CONST. amends. XIII–XV; Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 
No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 
U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-
110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973, to 1973bb-
1(2006)) 52 U.S.C.A. § 10301 (2014); Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90–
284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 to 3619). 
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subordination jurisprudence reflect what is now an accepted 
American cultural understanding that racial discrimination is 
not only wrong as a normative matter, but also an ongoing issue 
that these laws need to address.296  Similarly, international 
human rights law, including treaties to which the United 
States is a party like the ICCPR and the Convention on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, express that states have 
an obligation to ensure that citizens’ rights are protected 
equally by the state without regard to race.297 
Other states have acknowledged the dangers of racist 
practices and dialogue through their domestic law.  Many 
European states, in accordance with the ICCPR, criminalize 
racist speech and incitement to racist violence.298  In the 
aftermath of Nazism, the German government sought to 
suppress behavior and conduct that furthers oppressive 
ideology and discrimination.299  History has demonstrated that 
racial strife can lead to social discord and violence in the 
United States.300  Proactively targeting “racism as the threat” 
                                               
296 Andrew Arenge et al., Poll: 64 Percent of Americans Say Racism 
Remains a Major Problem, NBC NEWS (May 29, 2018), https://www. 
nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/poll-64-percent-americans-say-racism-
remains-major-problem-n877536 [https://perma.cc/6395-QY67]; Joe Neel, 
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(Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/10/24/ 
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United States, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., https://www.rwjf.org/ 
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views.html [https://perma.cc/SY37-74B9]. 
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and vulnerability, rather than minority communities as the 
threat, is a measure that would thwart foreign (and internal) 
efforts to spark conflict. 
A racism as national security threat framework would 
further the anti-subordination objectives of American and 
international antidiscrimination law by creating an additional 
policy rationale for state actors to proactively eliminate 
practices at the federal and local level that have discriminatory 
effects on racial minorities, further internal racial division, and 
create opportunities for foreign exploitation.  Framing racism 
as a national security threat would also enhance the rationale 
that executive antidiscrimination measures undertaken to 
confront national security vulnerabilities should receive the 
significant deference typically given by American courts on 
matters of national security.301  A thoroughly articulated racism 
as national security threat framework is also needed to help 
concretize the reality that racial division was employed by the 
Russian interference campaign against the United States in a 
broad, strategic manner on social media.302  Failure to identify 
racial division itself as a national security threat will result in 
responses to Russian election interference that focus exclusively 
on technical mechanisms to limit Russian cyber intrusion with-
out addressing the very vulnerability that Russians exploited. 
Further concretizing the reality that institutional 
practices that have a discriminatory effect on racial minorities 
exacerbates the national security vulnerability of the United 
States will provide additional justification for the elimination 
of such practices even when they are deemed permissible by 
American courts.  As seen in the cases of Korematsu and Iqbal 
and the recent Muslim Ban decision,303 the Court has often 
been deferential to the executive branch when a national 
security rationale is proffered for policies that have a 
disproportionate racial impact.  Similar court deference is seen 
                                               
301 In the case of Trump v. Hawaii, the Supreme Court applied the 
deferential rational basis review standard in assessing the President’s 
executive order instituting a ban on immigrants from certain majority-
Muslim countries—notwithstanding First Amendment concerns—because 
the executive order involved the national security function of the executive, 
and sufficient national security justifications validated the executive order 
according to the deferential standard.  138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420–2423 (2018) 
(“[O]ur inquiry into matters of . . . national security is highly constrained.”). 
302 See supra Part I. 
303 Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392. 
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in the context of local law enforcement practices that have a 
disproportionate racial impact on minority communities.304  
Nonetheless, those institutional practices inflame racial divi-
sions, even if a non-race-based national security justification is 
offered.  Since litigation and social justice movements alone will 
not end these practices, additional tools must be used.  A racism 
as national security threat framework encourages policymakers 
to direct the purveyors of these practices to end them—not 
only due to their discriminatory impact, but also because of the 
national security threat that they ultimately pose.  Enshrining 
this awareness in national security planning documents will 
also contribute to the reduction of the vulnerability. 
 
VII. OPERATIONALIZING A RACISM AS THREAT NATIONAL 
SECURITY APPROACH 
The executive branch has an array of tools to respond 
to new security threats.  While legislation is an effective tool 
for addressing legal matters on a relatively permanent basis, 
legal and policy priorities can often more efficiently be effec-
tuated through the issuance of executive orders, presidential 
directives, presidential memoranda, and national security 
strategies.  The issuance of national security planning docu-
ments, however, requires that a presidential administration 
prioritize the retrenchment of racial division and foreign 
election interference.  Though dependent on political realities, 
the suggestions in this Article are not tailored to the specific 
national political leaders of the present moment.305  Rather, 
                                               
304 See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2067–68, 2070 (2016) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[M]any innocent people are subjected to the 
humiliations of these unconstitutional searches.  The white defendant in 
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officer who had no evidence or reason to believe the pedestrian was engaged 
in illegal activity.  Id. at 2064. 
305 President Trump has failed to take comprehensive and organized 
action to target Russian election interference.  See Julian E. Barnes & Nicholas 
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this Article seeks to outline best practices for how leaders in 
the executive and legislative branches and in national security 
institutions, might address the unique threat highlighted by 
Russian interference in United States elections over time.   
This roadmap will remain available to current and future 
administrations, legislatures, and national security institutions.  
This Article seeks the implementation of these recommendations 
over time, aided by expanded public knowledge of the unique 
nature of Russian election interference through racial division 
on social media.  Section VII.A highlights legislative and regula-
tory proposals that focus on the regulation of social media.  
Section VII.B provides recommendations for how executive, 
legislative, and administrative officials at the federal and state 
level can reduce state practices that foment racial division and 
create fertile ground for Russian interference.  Lastly, Section 
VII.C discusses how the racism as threat framework can help 
support legislative reform in this space. 
 
A. Regulating Social Media Platforms 
As discussed in Part V, existing international law and 
United States domestic law frameworks do not fully address 
the unique threat of Russian cyber interference that seeks to 
exacerbate racial division.  The development of a targeted and 
proportionate response that deters such activity has yet to be 
identified.306  Any counterintelligence responses, due to their 
                                               
2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/elections/trump-admin-has-no-
central-strategy-election-security-no-one-n895256 [https://perma.cc/SN2L-
YQ34].  Congress has similarly failed to advance election security legislation.  
James Lamond, The 2020 Election Is Vulnerable. Congress Needs to Guard 
Against Attacks Starting Now., USA TODAY (Nov. 25, 2018), https://www.usa 
today.com/story/opinion/2018/11/25/2020-election-hacking-interference-
russia-congress-legislation-trump-column/2078279002 [https://perma.cc/7L45-
Y8HU].  Though the recommendations in this Article will most likely be applied 
by a future presidential administration, it is the author’s hope that Congress 
may still be persuaded to act on a bipartisan basis to protect the electoral 
process. 
306 The Obama Administration’s expulsion of Russian diplomats 
and intelligence agents and closure of Russian diplomatic compounds in 
December 2016 following revelations of a Russian interference campaign did 
not deter Russian election interference.  See Jeremy Diamond, Director of 
National Intelligence: Russian Interference in US Political System Ongoing, 
CNN (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/02/politics/dan-coats-
russia-interference-election-security/index.html [https://perma.cc/RM77-
DRFN]; Lauren Gambino et al., Obama Expels 35 Russian Diplomats in 
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covert nature, are unlikely to be acknowledged by American 
officials, making their efficacy in deterring election interference 
difficult to assess.  Some scholars have called for greater 
transparency in American political candidate contact with 
foreign governments.307  However, even if candidate contact 
with Russian agents is controlled, Russia and other states are 
still likely to engage in their interference campaigns from 
afar.308  Criminal indictment of foreign officials and entities 
under United States law is also an insufficient deterrent.  
Mueller’s indictments are unlikely to result in the prosecution 
of the indicted Russian agents and agencies due to Russia’s 
refusal to extradite them as well as Russia’s claims of 
innocence.309 
Policy advocates have called for new legislation that 
minimizes Russian cyber intrusion and encourages proactive 
regulation by social media platforms.  A new German law that 
requires social media platforms to remove hate-stirring 
messages within twenty-four hours and a similar proposal by 
French president Macron have been criticized due to 
                                               
Retaliation for US Election Hacking, GUARDIAN (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www. 
theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/29/barack-obama-sanctions-russia-
election-hack [https://perma.cc/2WDJ-99XV]; Ali Watkins, Obama Team Was 
Warned in 2014 About Russian Interference, POLITICO (Aug. 14, 2017), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/14/obama-russia-election-interference-
241547 [https://perma.cc/77T2-8CPM]. 
307 For example, Anthony Gaughan has called for a mandatory 
forty-eight-hour reporting period by all United States political campaigns of 
any contacts with foreign governments.  Anthony J. Gaughan, Trump, Twitter, 
and the Russians: The Growing Obsolescence of Federal Campaign Finance 
Law, 27 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 79, 126 (2017). 
308 But note that some policy advocates have called for the articulation 
of standards in foreign election intervention that clearly distinguish foreign 
support for democratic elections in authoritarian and nondemocratic states 
from the covert spreading of misinformation in democratic states with free 
and fair electoral processes.  These policy advocates’ hope is that clearly 
articulated standards will help galvanize a concerted response from states 
that support democracy against authoritarian states that seek to undermine 
it.  See Joshua Geltzer & Jake Sullivan, How to Prevent the Next Election 
Disaster, POLITICO (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story 
/2019/01/22/prevent-election-disaster-224032 [https://perma.cc/4FPY-ESNN].     
309 Martin Pengelly, Putin: Russia Will “Never” Extradite 13 Nationals 
Indicted by Mueller, GUARDIAN (Mar. 4, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com 
/us-news/2018/mar/04/vladimir-putin-never-extradite-13-russians-robert-
mueller [https://perma.cc/YJB4-JC28]. 
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censorship concerns.310  A comparable proposal in the United 
States would likely be challenged on First Amendment 
grounds.  The Alliance for Securing Democracy311 has called 
for legislation that would apply the same truthfulness standards 
to political advertisements on social media as apply in 
traditional media under the Honest Ads Act.312  In the inter-
national law arena, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Minority Staff have called for the United States to initiate the 
drafting of an international treaty, modeled after arms control 
agreements, that would provide clear rules for the use of cyber 
tools during peacetime.313  The proposal has merit, although it 
would take some time to negotiate such a treaty, and Russia 
would need to agree to become a party in order to be governed 
by its terms.  The treaty would also need to contain precise 
mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement in order to deter 
practices that have become a key element of Russia’s geopolitical 
strategy. 
Finally, advocates have called for greater self-regulation 
of online hate-based content by social media companies.314  
                                               
310 Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz [NetzDG] [Network Enforcement 
Act], June 30, 2017, DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN [BT] 18/12356, 
https://cdn.netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/2017/06/Synopse-NetzDG-final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TMD3-FPTR] (Ger.); see also Rick Noack, Everything We 
Know So Far About Russian Election Meddling in Europe, WASH. POST (Jan. 
10, 2018), https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.washingtonpost.com/amp 
html/news/worldviews/wp/2018/01/10/everything-we-know-so-far-about-
russian-election-meddling-in-europe [https://perma.cc/LC2X-XBMY].  Critics 
of the law have argued that it opens the door to censorship.  Germany: Flawed 
Social Media Law, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/ 
news/2018/02/14/germany-flawed-social-media-law [https://perma.cc/9NQE-
2NS3].  
311 Jankowicz, supra note 23. 
312 Foreign Influence Operations’ Use of Social Media Platforms 
(Third Party Expert Witnesses): Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on 
Intelligence, 115th Cong. 31, 40, 70 (2018) (statement of Laura Rosenberger, 
Director, Alliance for Securing Democracy).  See generally Honest Ads Act, 
S. 1989, 115th Cong. (2017). 
313 SFRC REPORT, supra note 41, at 161. 
314 See Curt Levey, Self-Regulation, Not Government Regulation, 
Should Keep Russian Ads Off Facebook, HILL (Nov. 1, 2017), https:// 
thehill.com/opinion/cybersecurity/358267-self-regulation-not-government-
regulation-should-keep-russian-ads-off [https://perma.cc/Z5S5-KNMA]; John 
Samples, Why the Government Should Not Regulate Content Moderation of 
Social Media, CATO INST. (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.cato.org/publications 
/policy-analysis/why-government-should-not-regulate-content-moderation-
social-media#full [https://perma.cc/R5UL-MBFQ]. 
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The Center for American Progress has called for companies to 
proactively make and enforce terms-of-use policies that make 
the incitement of hate online a basis for the termination and 
suspension of accounts.315  Most social media companies have 
such terms-of-use policies, even having them during the 
Russian election interference in 2016.316  The key to effective 
self-regulation is greater investment of resources in the 
monitoring of hate-based accounts and the provision of 
avenues for appeal.  This will ensure that monitors are not 
impermissibly targeting viewpoints or terminating the 
accounts of legitimate users.317  Even if these legislative and 
self-regulatory tools are adopted, Russian campaigns will 
continue to target social media platforms and may have some 
continued success in disseminating divisive rhetoric online 
through false profiles.  To combat and mitigate this ongoing 
threat, a robust national security response must directly 
address state action that inflames racial division. 
 
B. National Security Strategy Targeting Racism 
The use of executive measures to address racism and 
newly identified security threats is not novel.  Case studies 
from the Clinton and Obama administrations provide excellent 
examples that illustrate how new policy priorities and better-
understood security threats were addressed using executive 
orders, national security strategy documents, and presidential 
memoranda.  President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,898 
in 1994, titled Federal Actions to Address Environmental 
Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations, 
to require federal agencies to take action on programs that 
had an adverse impact on the health or environment of 
minority and low-income populations.318  President Obama 
                                               
315 Aastha Uprety & Danyelle Solomon, Combating Hate and White 





317 Id.  Though the scope of First Amendment rights on social media 
has not yet been definitively adjudicated, social media companies should act 
in accordance with the spirit of the First Amendment and not engage in 
viewpoint discrimination or censorship.  
318 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
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issued a 2015 national security strategy that identified climate 
change as “an urgent and growing threat to our national 
security” and a 2016 presidential memorandum that directed 
federal agencies “to ensure that climate change-related 
impacts are fully considered in the development of national 
security doctrine, policies, and plans.”319  The environmental 
justice executive order under President Clinton and the 
national security strategy and policy memorandum addressing 
climate change under President Obama reflect presidential 
responses to identified equity and security challenges.320  Insti-
tutionalized discrimination that becomes a focal point for 
Russian interference could similarly be addressed by a willing 
administration through these same mechanisms. 
 
1. Targeting Racism Through Executive 
Order 
The United States has a long history of utilizing 
executive orders to prohibit discriminatory practices.  In 1941, 
President Roosevelt issued executive orders that required 
government defense contractors to agree in their defense 
contracts not to discriminate on the basis of race or national 
origin.321  In 1954, President Eisenhower, by executive order, 
prohibited government contractors from discriminating on the 
basis of race, religion, color, or national origin in employment, 
promotion, demotion, or transfer.322  In 1961, President Kennedy 
issued an executive order requiring federal contractors to 
certify that they would “take affirmative action to ensure that 
applicants are employed, and that employees are treated . . . 
without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin.”323  
In 1965, President Johnson issued Executive Order 11,246, 
                                               
319 Memorandum on Climate Change and National Security, 2016 
DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 621 (Sept. 21, 2016); Statement on the 2015 
National Security Strategy, 2015 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 85 (Feb. 6, 2015). 
320 Memorandum on Climate Change and National Security, 2016 
DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 621 (Sept. 21, 2016); Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 
Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
321 Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 234 (Supp. 1941); Exec. Order 
No. 9001, 6 Fed. Reg. 6787 (Dec. 27, 1941). 
322 Exec. Order No. 10,557, 19 Fed. Reg. 5655 (Sept. 3, 1954). 
323 Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (Mar. 6, 1961). 
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which prohibited discrimination in federal employment due to 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.324   
In addition to prohibiting racial discrimination by the 
federal government or by federally-affiliated contractors, 
Presidents have also used executive orders to prohibit govern-
ment practices that have had a racially discriminatory impact.  
A number of federal housing executive orders, for example, 
were issued to prevent discrimination in federally owned 
housing.325  President Clinton expanded on this tradition of 
prohibiting federal agency action that has a discriminatory 
effect on minority communities by issuing Executive Order 
12,898 in 1994 to prohibit federal agency action that has a 
negative environmental or health effect on minority and low-
income communities.326   
Clinton’s executive order to prohibit federal agency harm 
to minority communities in the environmental space could 
serve as a model for an executive order prohibiting state action 
that has a disparate impact in the national security arena.  
This executive order would seek to minimize institutional 
discrimination and disparate racial impacts by government 
agencies.  Racial profiling, private prison funding, federal prose-
cution, and sentencing practices would all be subject to review 
and alteration.  Unlike in litigation where a national security 
rationale often serves as a justification for judges to uphold 
practices despite their disparate racial impact,327 an executive 
order would require federal agencies to end such practices 
because they undermine the national security interests of the 
nation.   
Some executive orders addressing national security have 
inferred that negative racial impacts undermine national 
security.  Though not explicit in its terms, Executive Order 
12,333 was drafted, in part, as a response to the racially 
discriminatory targeting of civil rights organizations under J. 
Edgar Hoover.328  Making this goal—the avoidance of racially 
                                               
324 Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sept. 24, 1965). 
325 See Exec. Order No. 11,063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,527 (Nov. 20, 1962); 
Exec. Order No. 12,892, 59 Fed. Reg. 2939 (Jan. 17, 1994). 
326 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
327 See, e.g., discussion of the Korematsu and Iqbal cases supra 
Part IV. 
328 See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted as 
amended in 50 U.S.C. § 3002 (2017) (originally classified as 50 U.S.C. § 401 
(2006)). 
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discriminatory conduct—explicit in an existing or new national 
security executive order would enable a direct response to the 
racial divisions fueling the Russian interference campaigns. 
 
2. A Model National Security Strategy and 
Executive Order 
As required by law, every presidential administration 
produces an annual national security strategy report to 
Congress that details, among other things, the “worldwide 
interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are 
vital to the national security of the United States” and 
“proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, 
economic, military, and other elements of the national power 
of the United States to protect or promote the interests and 
achieve the goals and objectives” of the nation.329  The report 
provides administrations with an opportunity to detail new 
national security challenges that they must confront or to 
present innovative approaches to a national security challenge.  
In his 2015 national security strategy, President Obama 
became the first President to detail how he perceived address-
ing climate change as a national security priority of the United 
States.330  While previous administrations had not characterized 
it as a national security threat in the same manner, the Obama 
Administration determined that the impacts of climate change 
presented serious national security challenges to the United 
States and detailed the measures that it had taken and would 
continue to take to respond to climate change.331  In his 2016 
presidential memorandum, President Obama operationalized 
this national security priority by directing federal departments 
and agencies to “ensure that climate change-related impacts 
are fully considered in the development of national security 
doctrine, policies, and plans.”332  The presidential memorandum 
                                               
329 50 U.S.C § 3043 (2017) (originally classified as 50 U.S.C. § 404a 
(2006)). 
330 Statement on the 2015 National Security Strategy, 2015 DAILY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 85 (Feb. 6, 2015). 
331 Id. 
332 Memorandum on Climate Change and National Security, 2016 
DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 621 (Sept. 21, 2016). 
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created an interagency task force charged with developing an 
action plan for implementing the new climate change strategy.333 
Just as climate change was incorporated into the 2015 
national security strategy, a future national security strategy 
should prioritize the elimination of state action with disparate 
racial impacts.  To help develop and implement the strategy, 
a task force should be formed with the reduction of institutional 
racism as a key objective.  There is precedent for such an ap-
proach.  President Obama created a task force on twenty-first 
century policing in response to the shooting of Michael Brown 
in Ferguson, Missouri and the unrest that followed.334   
Some general principles would need to apply to the 
national security strategy.  To ensure that the strategy does 
not become a new mechanism for targeting American citizens 
or organizations labeled as racially polarizing,335 the emphasis 
of the strategy would be on reducing state action that results 
in disparate racial impacts that are exploited as part of a foreign 
influence campaign.  As with President Obama’s twenty-first 
century policing task force, community organizations and non-
government experts would be included.336  The national security 
strategy would include findings that detail how the Russian 
government seeks to influence democratic electoral processes 
through a targeted social media campaign that inflames racial 
divisions and polarizes the electorate.  It would prioritize the 
retrenchment of institutional racism and disparate racial 
impacts in federal, state, and local government actions as a 
prophylactic measure against Russian influence campaigns.  
Government actions having a disparate impact on minority 
communities would be identified and plans would be developed 
for their minimization.  An executive order that outlines the 
racial equity scheme would then operationalize the national 
security strategy. 
 
                                               
333 Id. 
334 Exec. Order No. 13,684, 79 Fed. Reg. 76,865 (Dec 18, 2014); see 
also PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF 
THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING (2015).  
335 Mechanisms already exist for investigating and prosecuting 
extremist organizations with violent ideologies; the goal of this effort is to 
reduce polarizing state action and to respond to foreign state activity. 
336 PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, supra note 
334. 
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3. A Response to Critiques  
A racism as threat national security approach would 
not be without its critics.  Some may argue that institutionalized 
racism does not exist, particularly on the part of national 
security and law enforcement institutions.  However, there is 
significant evidence that indicates various national security 
and law enforcement practices have a disproportionately 
negative impact on minority communities, as discussed in 
Part IV.  Additionally, assessments of the 2016 Russian election 
interference campaign unequivocally demonstrated that 
Russians targeted Americans with a racially divisive cyber 
campaign.337  Some might argue that targeting institutional 
discrimination is not a direct response to Russian election 
interference.  Yet, a racism as threat national security strategy 
is an important element of any such response because it seeks 
to decrease the scope and intensity of internal racial division 
stemming from policies that have a disparate racial impact.  
The less intense the internal racial divisions in the United 
States, the less likely Russia will be able to exploit those divi-
sions.  It should also be noted that the exploitation of internal 
societal divisions is not only an American vulnerability—
Russia has also targeted democratic elections in European 
states as part of a global geopolitical strategy to destabilize 
governments and influence elections with cyber campaigns 
uniquely targeted to the racial and social divisions within those 
states.338 
Finally, some might critique a national security strategy 
that seeks to mitigate institutional discrimination as a bulwark 
against Russian cyber intrusion because the federal government 
does not control state and local law enforcement practices that 
have disparate impacts on minority communities.  The response 
to both critiques is similar.  While the current administration 
might not be receptive to this national security strategy, many 
state and local officials are likely to be sympathetic to these 
concerns.  A racism as threat national security strategy could be 
pursued in all fifty states and would provide state and local 
officials with an additional policy rationale to eliminate state and 
local practices that have a disparate racial impact.  In the 
absence of federal leadership, state and local officials concerned 
                                               
337 See discussion supra Section II.A. 
338 See discussion supra Section II.C. 
262 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW [Vol. 9:2 
 
about protecting electoral processes and the national security of 
the United States could convene a task force to consider what 
actions they might collectively take to mitigate Russian cyber 
intrusion.  Similarly, a presidential administration supportive of 
a racism as threat national security approach could work 
closely with state, local, and community leaders to pursue 
an institutional discrimination mitigation strategy.     
 
C. Bolstering Legislative Reform 
The value of a racism as threat framework is that it 
helps to crystalize for policymakers that internal racial division 
is augmented by state practices that have a negative impact on 
minority communities and that such divisions can now be 
weaponized against the United States through foreign cyber 
influence campaigns.  The American people have a collective 
interest in minimizing state-based sources of racial discord that 
are so easily weaponized against the United States.  A national 
security rationale should be proffered when federal and state 
legislatures attempt to address practices that have a disparate 
racial impact.  Racial profiling in criminal enforcement against 
the Black community, immigration-related investigation of the 
Latinx community, and terror-related investigation of the 
Muslim community should be understood as equal protection 
violations and national security threats that create space for 
foreign influence campaigns.  Such an understanding would 
motivate national security advocates to join with civil rights 
advocates in pushing for legislative reform that seeks to 
eliminate state practices that have disparate racial impacts. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
American national security institutions have historically 
been shaped by the views of their leaders.  Accordingly, national 
security institutions have likewise been vulnerable to the per-
sonal fears and biases of those in charge.  Since the nation’s 
founding, a recurring theme of minority race as threat has man-
ifested itself in institutional policies.  This theme has reflected 
racial tensions and divisions in American society, creating a 
space for racially biased practices such as COINTELPRO’s 
disruption of civil rights organizations, the World War II 
internment of Japanese citizens, post-9/11 racial profiling of 
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Muslims, and punitive immigration crackdowns on Latinx 
communities. 
For nearly a century, Russia has actively capitalized on 
American racial divisions for its own geopolitical advantage.  
During the Cold War, America’s treatment of racial minorities 
was the bedrock of Russia’s global criticism regarding the 
limitations of American liberal democracy.  Today, Russia has 
found a new front for this delegitimization campaign—within 
the United States through the social media interactions of 
Americans.  Russia has attempted to weaponize America’s racial 
divisions against its democratic processes through “fake news,” 
social media advertisements, and social media posts meant to 
rile existing divisions.  The more divided and disenchanted 
Americans become with their fellow citizens and with their 
political processes, the less the United States (and its Western 
colleagues) will be able to galvanize collective pressure against 
Russian geopolitical objectives.   
Because of its fraught history with race and because 
Russia has effectively intensified racial divisions online, 
America must acknowledge in its national security and policy-
planning strategies that racism is a strategic threat to the 
United States and incorporate measures to address that 
threat.  Racism is not just a moral or equality failure, but also 
a strategic threat that is exploitable by America’s enemies.  
The most direct response to this strategic threat is to take 
measures to minimize and eliminate it.  Fortunately, the actions 
of state agents are precisely where the federal, state, and local 
government can target reform efforts.  Reducing institutional-
ized racism will reduce racial tensions, which will in turn reduce 
Russia’s ability to stimulate divisions.  Americans whose rights 
and interests are adequately and fairly being protected by the 
state are less likely to be vulnerable to Russia’s weaponized 
racial division. 
This Article seeks to begin a conversation with the 
public, American political leaders, and policymakers about the 
importance of American institutional leaders treating racism 
as a national security threat deserving of a clear and direct 
response.  The author’s hope is that this piece will encourage 
further study and action on this topic.  Eliminating institutional 
racism is a generations-long effort that will require action on 
a number of fronts—executive, legislative, judicial, political, 
academic, federal, state, and local—and national security 
planning must be one of those fronts.  To those that believe 
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that eliminating racial discrimination and racial division is 
impossible, this Article suggests that any tools that help to 
minimize institutional discrimination and racial division, 
however imperfect, are worthy of pursuit.  A racism as national 
security threat framework is a new tool in the arsenal. 
